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The Poetics of Spice: Romantic Consumerism and the Exotic by Timothy Morton.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. xiii Ⳮ 282. $59.95 cloth.
In this age of electronic media, the relevance of literary criticism is sometimes questioned as an antiquated analytical approach from an outdated era.
For many of us who teach and write about literature, the significance of literary analysis seems obvious: the interpretive skills used in examining literature
serve broadly beyond the discipline. Although not necessarily intended as
such, The Poetics of Spice, Timothy Morton’s impressively detailed and wideranging study of spice and Romantic consumerism, provides an encompassing
vindication of the power and importance of literary criticism. Morton argues
the effectiveness of literary criticism for examining his topic, the ‘‘persistence
of tropes, figures, emblems and so forth involving spice,’’ by noting that
Literary criticism, aware of the complexities of figurative language, is
able to demonstrate aspects of this topic which have not been pursued in cultural anthropology and histories of the commodity. It is
able to treat issues of rhetoric, representation, aesthetics and ideology, including notions of race and gender, in ways that make us sensitive to the power and ambiguity of sign systems. (9)
Morton’s complex engagement throughout The Poetics of Spice with issues in
critical theory such as these will appeal to an audience of readers beyond Romantic specialists; indeed, Morton addresses literary criticism as much as literary and cultural texts. I found myself inspired by Morton’s arguments to
reconsider ways I teach and write about not only the Romantic texts Morton
analyzes, but also poetics and literary theory overall.
The Poetics of Spice will also appeal to a broad range of literary scholars
because although Morton examines a significant number of Romantic-era texts
in this study, he argues convincingly that the poetics of spice forms a much
larger continuum, a ‘‘style of consuming’’ (11) that he traces for millennia, to
the present. In fact, as Morton notes, by the Romantic era, the maritime trade
in spices was waning, while the cultural operations of spice ‘‘as discourse, not
an object, naively transparent to itself’’ (3) maintained and increased their potency. He analyzes spice as a sign system using a ‘‘diachronic approach’’ (6)
that ‘‘does not assume a teleological narrative or a rigid division between modern and pre-modern’’ (18). As a result, Morton provides readings of work from
the Biblical to the postmodern, from sources as varied as cookbooks, the
graphic arts, medicine, and the trade in commodities such as perfume, sugar,
cinnamon, and pepper.
As one might expect from its title, this book enters the critical conversations about Romanticism and orientalism of the last fifteen years, but with an
important expansion of focus. Morton argues that orientalism and colonialism
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‘‘are often construed through a psychoanalytic discourse of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ ’’
that ‘‘can be expanded with histories of the object in colonial and orientalist
texts’’ (205). What Morton wishes to avoid, however, is the way the ‘‘study of
the object often presupposes a naive empirical collection of detail as its goal,’’
instead arguing that the ‘‘study of consumption raises the question of enjoyment and suffering’’ and fantasy often left out of empirical collections of data
(205). As a result, postcolonial theory is only one dimension of Morton’s critical strategy here. Morton rejects New Historicist or cultural studies labels for
his work, and points instead to deconstruction, close reading, and the work
of ‘‘Lacanian post-Marxist philosopher Slavoj Žižek’’ (3) as the foundations of
his examination of ‘‘relationships between language, desire, and power’’ (3–4).
As these brief quotations illustrate, an important dimension of this book is the
way Morton thoroughly dissects the terms of his analysis, perhaps echoing the
‘‘self-reflexive’’ qualities he emphasizes in Romantic consumerism.
As a result, one of the most engaging aspects of this book is the way these
analytical terms evolve throughout the study. Morton organizes his textual
readings around a series of topoi or founding elements of ‘‘the poetics of
spice’’. These topoi and other figurative devices form the core of his close readings. While I cannot entirely encapsulate Morton’s complex arguments here, I
will briefly describe several of the terms that recur most often and note a few
of the ways he uses these concepts to read Romantic texts.
Central to Morton’s work is the idea that the poetics of spice has two qualities: ‘‘materiality and transumption’’ (19). The materiality of spice is connected to its role ‘‘halfway between object and sign, goods and money’’ (19),
and as such, as a stimulus of desire. One example of this poetic function of
spice can be seen in the ‘‘trade winds topos’’ (the perfumed breeze thought to
waft from the exotic regions from which spices originate). Morton identifies
this topos in a variety of settings, including Milton’s Paradise Lost, arguing that
‘‘Milton sets the figurative agenda’’ (46) for the poetics of spice and presents
Satan’s journey from Hell to Chaos as a sort of spice trader’s travels (68).
Throughout The Poetics of Spice and especially in Chapter 2, Morton traces the
trade winds topos and related topoi of materiality (e.g. the Poison Tree) in the
work of Erasmus Darwin, William Blake, Percy Shelley, and Charlotte Smith,
among others.
Transumption, the second quality Morton associates with the poetics of
spice, follows Harold Bloom’s reworking of this rhetorical concept. Morton argues that spice is, importantly, a sort of metasign, that ‘‘serves as a figure for
poetic language itself’’ (19) as he explains Bloom’s sense of transumption. Dryden is an important literary source for this metaleptic quality of spice (which
emerges particularly in the Romantic era); Morton suggests that Dryden’s
works are ‘‘paradigmatic of a novel kind of capitalist poetics, relying on the
representation of the spice trade. [. . . ] Spice is not a balm but an object of
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trade, a trope to be carried across boundaries, standing in for money: a metaphor about metaphor’’ (75). Here and throughout his study, Morton articulates
well how spice as object (e.g. cinnamon) also always tropes desire for the exotic and embodies essential values of the commodity. ‘‘Spice is the very form of
the idea of the commodity itself, a form of what Žižek calls ‘spiritual substance’ ’’
(23), Morton argues, connecting this idea of the commodity to consumerism,
which, newly self-reflexive in the Romantic era, capitalizes upon spice’s transumptive nature. Morton’s analysis of Paradise Lost suggests important new
ways to view Milton’s influence on the Romantics and argues that ‘‘Milton’s
Satan was a template for this self-reflexive consciousness’’ emerging in the Romantic era (105). As these brief overviews of materiality and transumption
suggest, Morton’s literary readings effectively fuse deconstructive, Marxist, and
psychoanalytic approaches to understanding the evolution of spice as capitalist discourse.
From these readings of Milton and Dryden, Morton loosely follows literary chronology in the examples of the poetics of spice he traverses on his way
to the Romantic era (though he also intersperses briefer readings of Romantic
texts in the first eighty pages or so). The latter two thirds of the book are
mostly devoted to reading a variety of Romantic era texts in lesser and greater
amounts of detail, including works by Anna Seward, Mary Shelley, Samuel
Taylor Coleridge, Helen Maria Williams, Felicia Hemans, Thomas Moore, John
Keats, Robert Southey, Leigh Hunt, William Jones, and so forth. If I were to
critique any aspect of this astonishing study, it might be to wish that Morton
had been able to give us close readings of even larger portions of the works he
includes, for his analyses are engaging and vividly bring to life the poetics he
deduces over the course of the book.
Several brief examples from his more detailed readings of the ways the
Romantics use the poetics of spice will illustrate further Morton’s fusion of
critical terminology with textual analysis. In his study of Coleridge’s The Rime
of the Ancient Mariner, Morton argues that the poem’s medievalism and its
commodified qualities as an ‘‘ ‘antiqued’ text’’ reflect the ‘‘moment of modernity’’ that produced the idea of the antique (122). Furthermore, this antiquarianism can be seen in connection with spice, in that ‘‘[. . .] spice is an antique
marker of capitalist expansion, luxury and desire. Spice per se (cinnamon,
pepper, and so forth) becomes ideologically useful precisely at the point at
which it is less materially useful, even for fuelling the capitalist economy’’ (7).
These threads of medievalism and spice are continued in Morton’s long
reading of Keats’s The Eve of St. Agnes, an important core of this book. In his
reading of Keats’s poem, the dual nature of spice as materiality and as transumption is incorporated in another of the analytical terms Morton employs,
the ‘‘emulsion’’—in which two immiscible ‘‘elements [. . .] are not dissolved
into each other’’ but are suspended in tension (33). Emulsion characterizes a
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number of spice’s traits for Morton and is an apt term for capturing the deconstructive multiplicity of meaning the poetics of spice represent. (Another such
term is Derrida’s pharmakon, meaning ‘‘either poison or cure, and an unstable,
destabilising flow’’ (41) which Morton uses throughout his book, especially in
readings of Milton and Keats.) For his reading of The Eve of St. Agnes, Morton
coins the term ‘‘the blancmange effect’’ to describe Keats’s emulsive strategy
in this poem, particularly in Porphyro’s feast for Madeleine in stanza 30. (A
blancmange incorporates bland ingredients, like milk, chicken, rice, with
spices such as ginger, sugar, and rosewater [150].) The concept of the blancmange enables Morton to take issue with other readings of Keats’s poem, such
as Marjorie Levinson’s argument in Keats’ Life of Allegory that Porphyro’s banquet features ‘‘ ‘children’s foods.’ ’’ He argues that instead we see an ‘‘emulsive
tension’’ between ‘‘[m]ilky food and spice’’ that ‘‘precisely mirrors the larger
figurative patterns of The Eve of St. Agnes—a witty staging of the impossible
sexual relationship’’ (151–152).
A final example from Morton’s readings of Romantic texts illustrates another dimension of his far-ranging work, an analysis of the abolitionist and
proslavery debates of the era. Morton coins another term to read these texts,
the ‘‘blood sugar topos’’ (173) in which abolitionists suggest that sugar is actually tainted with the blood of the slaves who produce it, and that consumers
should imagine this literally: ‘‘The sweetened drinks of tea, coffee and chocolate are rendered suddenly nauseating by the notion that they are full of the
blood of slaves’’ (173). Morton points out the ways that ‘‘The blood sugar
topos reverses consumption into production, figurality into literality, and supplementarity into essence’’ (175). Robert Southey’s ‘‘Poems on the Slave Trade’’
is the central text of the chapter focused upon the blood sugar topos, and Morton asks complex questions about Southey’s attitudes in these sonnets: ‘‘[. . .]
is Southey supporting rebellion by the slaves or reform by the planters and
consumers? Are the Africans victims or agents? Like Coleridge’s lecture,
Southey’s reformist text is haunted by the possibility of rebellion, and one has
to wonder whether this is meant as a threat and goad to reform, or as a more
complex celebration of revolutionary struggle’’ (196). As Morton notes, the
‘‘[. . .] Romantic period provided special conditions for the critique of trade,
and hence the revision of the [trade winds] topos’’ (42) as seen in Southey’s
work, among others.
As these brief summaries of a few of Morton’s readings may indicate, one
of the most compelling aspects of this book, in addition to the brilliant use of
theory (many important terms of which I have not been able to present here,
such as spice’s elements of ekphrasis and fantasia), is the complexity Morton
discovers in the cultural markers and texts he analyzes. One cannot call Morton’s work reductive in the least, and its density rewards the careful reader. By
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the final chapter, one is thoroughly intrigued by the ways of reading Morton
presents—and inspired to apply these to a variety of texts on one’s own.
Susan B. Taylor
University of Colorado, Colorado Springs



The Gang: Coleridge, the Hutchinsons & the Wordsworths in 1802 by John Worthen. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001. Pp. 344. $30.00 cloth.
Biographies construct one among many possible histories of a life, and
books of criticism that focus upon one aspect of a literary career are fragmentary biographies. The biography may trace a religious life, a poetic career, a
philosophic or social quest, or, as is common now, an emotional and sexual
life. Biography has become biology. Future biographies may concentrate upon
a writer’s finances, profession, or public life. Some recent biographies offer
new research, but many simply re-read the existing printed evidence and are
judged on the plausibility of their readings. John Worthen’s biography of Coleridge, the Wordsworths, and the Hutchinsons is a welcome change from the
limiting focus on one individual life, for the obvious reason that a creative life
is often the intersection of a large number of public and private influences,
correspondences, and conversations. As Thomas McFarland once wrote,
‘‘There are no Robinson Crusoes of the intellect.’’ Worthen’s group biography
helps us think about what constitutes such a group, how, on a daily basis, it
generated literature through collaborative creativity, as well as the limits of the
evidence available to know such a group.
Recent criticism has shifted from Romantic individuality to the dialogic
and discursive elements of the Romantics’ art, and there is no better test case
for collaborative creativity than the relationship of Wordsworth and Coleridge.
Previous biographies of the two poets read the relationship as antagonistic and
commonly praise one poet and condemn the other. Thus Coleridge is either
the victim of Wordsworth’s public and private criticism, which destroyed him
as a poet, or morally hopeless, unable to fulfill his promise; Wordsworth is the
quintessential poet of individual imagination, or a domineering egotist, whom
Keats described as a bully, and who yet needed both Coleridge’s encouragement and his philosophical speculation. Worthen singles out McFarland,
Molly Lefebure, and particularly Richard Holmes, who blame Wordsworth’s
callous cancellation of ‘‘Christabel’’ from the second edition of Lyrical Ballads,
and Mary Moorman, who regarded Wordsworth’s decision to exclude ‘‘Christabel’’ as an appropriate judgment. One could also question Wordsworth’s note
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to ‘‘The Ancient Mariner’’ in the second volume of Lyrical Ballads: ‘‘The Poem
of my Friend has indeed great defects.’’
Worthen wisely avoids taking sides and notes that in spite of these major
issues, their daily letters and journals offer a different picture of their relationship between 1800 and 1802, one of their mutual affection and unremitting
interchange of poetry and letters. Worthen has written the biography of a creative group that includes not only the poets, but also Dorothy Wordsworth,
and the sisters Sara and Mary Hutchinson as members, in 1802, as an extended family. The book is divided into three sections: ‘‘Pre-History,’’ including brief histories of the Wordsworths settling in Grasmere in 1799 and 1800,
along with the early days of March 1802, including Coleridge’s trip from
London to Grasmere and his visit to Sara Hutchinson along the way; ‘‘Joy and
Melancholy,’’ March to July, when Coleridge’s ‘‘Dejection: An Ode’’ and
Wordsworth’s ‘‘Immortality Ode’’ and ‘‘Resolution and Independence’’ were
originally drafted; and ‘‘To the Wedding,’’ the months leading up to Wordsworth’s wedding on October 4 and the publication of a partial text of ‘‘Dejection: An Ode’’ in the Morning Post on the same day, including William and
Dorothy’s August trip to Calais to see Annette Vallon and their child. Worthen
emphasizes the emotional ties that bound the group: Wordsworth’s wedding
to Mary Hutchinson and the possibility that his brother John was in love with
her; Wordsworth’s relationship with Dorothy and her wearing the wedding
ring the night before William’s marriage; the possibility that Dorothy was in
love with Coleridge; and Coleridge’s fantasy of love for Sara Hutchinson. Worthen doubts any extramarital sexual activity in the group and emphasizes the
group’s interest in children, Coleridge’s son Hartley, Sara Coleridge’s pregnancy during the summer, and Wordsworth’s contemplating starting a family
after his wedding. Still, his description of their emotional ties, their unconventional behavior, and Coleridge’s opium addiction portrays the group as a forerunner of a 1970s commune and inevitably raises questions about reading our
own experiences into the customs of the early nineteenth century.
But the group was more than a gathering of unconventional orphans sorting out their emotional lives. It was a creative group, one of the most complex
in literary history. The relations of Coleridge’s and Wordsworth’s poems have
been mapped before, and more can be done to assess their mutual influence.
The inclusion of Dorothy and the Hutchinson sisters as essential parts of this
creative group is a valuable contribution to our understanding of creativity.
Since they transcribed the poems, they constituted the first, and perhaps primary, audience for the poems. As critics, they were not inhibited, as Wordsworth’s response to Mary Hutchinson’s comments on ‘‘Resolution and
Independence’’ indicates. And as literary critics are increasingly recognizing,
Dorothy’s journals are a good read, in part, as Worthen explains, because they
were written for the group. How much, one is prompted to ask, is Dorothy’s
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sensibility found in Wordsworth’s poetry? Perhaps most important, their relationships were constituted in letters. They did not often live close to one another, so their communications were in writing. Worthen surmises from the
evidence in Dorothy’s journal that in some months she wrote letters every day,
yet only a small number survive. They were literally men and women of letters
and the group was tied together, not only by their emotional connections and
daily conversations, but also by the writing of journals and letters.
Worthen argues that their poems and journals originated in conversations,
letters, and fragmentary drafts in such a way that a poem’s origin cannot be
identified as coming from one writer or another. Their poems began as group
efforts. Encouraging as this argument is to those who wish to dismantle the
myth of individual authorship, questions arise about how a poem emerges
from the mazy confluence of conversation and letters to become an individual
utterance. The test case is the relationship of ‘‘The Immortality Ode,’’ ‘‘A Letter
[Sara Hutchinson],’’ ‘‘Resolution and Independence,’’ and ‘‘Dejection:
to
An Ode.’’ For most critics the sequence began on March 27, 1802 with Wordsworth’s drafting the first four stanzas of his ‘‘Ode,’’ followed by Coleridge’s
writing ‘‘A Letter,’’ on the evening of April 4, Wordsworth’s responsive ‘‘Resolution and Independence,’’ and finally Coleridge’s transforming ‘‘A Letter,’’ into
‘‘Dejection: An Ode.’’ Worthen argues ‘‘that the sequence of composition . . .
is almost unknowable’’ (138). He suggests that the first stanzas of Wordsworth’s ‘‘Ode’’ may have been written as early as 1800, since the opening lines
echo lines in ‘‘The Mad Monk,’’ on which modern editors are unable to agree
whether it belongs to Wordsworth or Coleridge. He also suggests that it is
highly unlikely that Coleridge could have written the 339 lines of ‘‘A Letter’’
between sunset and midnight on April 4, and that it is possible that ‘‘A Letter’’
and ‘‘Dejection’’ developed simultaneously.
When he questions the critics’ reliance on a clear sequence of poetic statement and response, Worthen’s skepticism is appropriate and healthy. Yet Worthen tends to equivocate on the description of the sequence. If by ‘‘sequence,’’
one means strict chronology in which drafts can be assigned to particular days
and hours, one must agree with him. But if by ‘‘sequence’’ one means the various drafts as statement and response, one must question his reading of the
evidence. The evidence for dating the beginning of the ‘‘ode’’ in 1800 is slim,
other than the existence of ‘‘The Mad Monk,’’ a poem very different from the
‘‘Ode.’’ Although the dating of manuscript evidence for Coleridge’s poetry is
not conclusive, the quotations and allusions in ‘‘A Letter’’ to Wordsworth’s ‘‘ode’’
indicate that it was written after the first four stanzas of Wordsworth’s poem.
There are in Coleridge’s ‘‘Letter’’ at least eight or ten clear quotations and allusions to the first four stanzas of the ‘‘Ode,’’ so that it is highly probable that
Wordsworth’s four stanzas existed in close to finished form before Coleridge
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began to write ‘‘A Letter.’’ Similarly the manic-depressive shifts that Wordsworth describes in ‘‘Resolution and Independece’’ are more typical of Coleridge than of himself. In short, Worthen may be right when he questions the
days and hours of composition, but when he ‘‘seeks to replace the beautifully
shaped orthodox account of series of poems and responses with one which is
a good deal less certain’’ (138), he seems to discount the evidence of the poetry
itself as individual dialogic utterances and to slight the fact that uniquely individual poetic forms emerged from the chaotic written exchanges of all the
group. After all, the final products of writing, whether they are Wordsworth’s
or Coleridge’s poems or Dorothy’s journals, are unique formal structures.
Worthen’s biographical reading of the 1802 poetry emphasizes the themes
of family and childhood, and hence he reads the opening stanzas of Wordsworth’s ‘‘Ode’’ as lamenting the loss of the child’s response to nature. The
problem, of course, is that there is nothing in the first four stanzas that says
Wordsworth has lost the light of childhood. There is no reference to his own
childhood in those lines; the reference to his childhood comes in the following
stanzas written in 1804. The allusions may suggest, rather, that in 1802 he
laments that loss of a light that was his in 1798 or 1800. The skepticism that
Worthen deploys in questioning other biographers’ claims could well be raised
against his biographical reading of the poems. These readings emphasize daily
lives and personal relationships, but one misses the flavor and fervor of other
topics that must have animated their conversaion. Coleridge’s political journalism, particularly his important ‘‘Once a Jacobin Always a Jacobin’’ article in
the Morning Post is slighted, as are Wordsworth’s political sonnets written in
France in August, which are read simply as defenses against more personal
themes. Coleridge’s great letter September 10, 1802 to William Sotheby on
imagination and the one life is nowhere to be found. It is difficult to imagine
their conversation empty of politics, philosophy, and aesthetics.



Paul Magnuson
New York University

Romanticism and Slave Narratives: Transatlantic Testimonies by Helen Thomas.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Cambridge Studies in Romanticism 38. Pp. xi Ⳮ 332. $59.95 cloth.
In Helen Thomas’s often illuminating and trenchant monograph, ‘‘Romanticism is recontextualized against a broader canvas of cultural exchanges,
geographical migrations and displaced identities’’ (5). The task she sets herself
is to place the African Diaspora and its consequences as central to the national
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and personal identities of canonical and non-canonical figures at the heart of
Romanticism. She uses the apparatus of postcolonial theories to further her
project describing a creolization and a hybridity as central to the self-realization of diasporan Africans in their writings. At its most radical in the work of
Robert Wedderburn, ‘‘the ‘creolised’ discourse of fluidity, heterogeneity, movement and change demarcated an illuminating revision of established (static)
concepts of power, possession and identity’’ (268). She neither labels the writings of diasporan Africans as pale European imitations or as deeply rooted Africanist texts, but shows how fundamentally bicultural they are. This move is
not particularly new but its use in juxtaposition to Romanticism makes for dynamic, if sometimes controversial, interventions.
She describes the ‘‘mulatto as the radical agent of socioeconomic transformation’’ (262). There are problems with this approach though, as her championing of the radical nature of ‘‘mulatto discourse,’’ in her discussion of the
Jamaican-born radical, Robert Wedderburn tends to essentialize mixed race
discourse in the same reductionist way African essentialism is prioritized in
much Black Nationalist criticism. ‘‘Mulatto discourse’’ is not always radical, as
the many mulatto slave traders in Africa and slave drivers in the Americas
prove. Wedderburn’s radicalism comes not merely from his mixed-race birth,
but, I would argue, principally from a working-class background that led to
his identifying class as an essential determinant of his radical politics. In this
he was like his fellow radical and Cato Street conspirator, William ‘Black’ Davidson. Moreover, Thomas almost completely elides the Naval context of Wedderburn’s radicalism, failing to cite Jesse Lemisch’s pioneering work on Jack
Tar (from 1968, republished 1993) or Marcus Rediker and Peter Linebaugh’s
account (first published in article form in 1993) of a multi-racial mobile proletariat of which Wedderburn was a part. There is a whole historical context
here that would have strengthened Thomas’s argument. The focus is so much
on the creolized and the hybrid in relation to the individual, that good oldfashioned working-class history and the thriving London black community is
rather marginalized.
Apart from Wedderburn, whose appearance is most welcome, this monograph parades the usual suspects both from the European tradition and the
African Diaspora. The only slave captain dealt with at length is John Newton.
The pioneering work of Suzanne Schwartz (1995) has uncovered an interesting character in James Irving, a former surgeon working out of Liverpool in
the 1780s. His journal and letters home could have provided a counterweight
to Newton’s eventual guilt about his role in the trade as Irving remained so
convinced of slavery’s justification that he continued in the trade even after
he himself had been enslaved by Moors for a year. The absence of Irving is
accompanied by other lacunae. The Narrative of Robert Adams (1816), which
details his enslavement in North Africa in 1810, having been a free black in
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America, could have provided useful evidence to buttress Thomas’s claims
about the complexities of hybridity and creolization. His experience of being
taken for white because of his status as American, crucially affected the Moors’
reaction to him and he used their uncertainty about his color to his own advantage. Thomas Jefferson is included but some of his most revealing writing
on race is overlooked. For instance, his discussion of a black Venus pudique
in an English garden could have provided must grist for the psycho-sexual
reading of his racial ideology, but it is not even mentioned here (Winthrop
Jordan had begun this work in White Over Black [1968]).
Likewise, although there is some astute commentary on John Stedman,
Thomas misses the chance to show how creolization was a two-way process
affecting Europeans as well as Africans. Thomas is right to emphasize Stedman’s eventual rejection of his mulatta mistress and the ‘‘erasure’’ of her and
his son by him from his narrative. However, the text, far from making the act
of miscegenation ‘‘almost unutterable’’ (130), as Thomas asserts, uses comic
conceit to explicate it to his readers. Thus, his mistress’s kiss ‘‘made my nose
as flat as her own’’ (qtd 129) literally racially marking him. This flirtation with
the other is shown to have the consequence of disturbing racial certainties,
and Stedman’s textual acknowledgment of this is not given sufficient weight
in Thomas’s discussion here. William Blake is discussed, but his etchings for
John Stedman’s book are quickly passed over even though they reveal as much,
if not more than his writings. The book is decidedly fixed on literary texts
when fuller attention to visual arts would have strengthened the discussion.
There are some concessions to oral literature, slave songs and folk tales
being mentioned, but their importance as explicators of slave culture is rather
undermined by the continued stress on literary texts. Even when Thomas is
dealing with Wedderburn’s rhetoric, its subaltern orality is rather downplayed—a more nuanced discussion of this rhetoric can be found in Linebaugh and Rediker’s The Many-Headed Hydra (2000). Popular cultural forms
take a back seat—there is no mention of slave fugitive advertisements or of
the marginal, but revealing, use of black Britons in newspaper advertisements.
Blacks on the stage or performing creolization as beggars are mainly absent
here too, despite their cultural richness as examples of African acculturation
in the face of exploitation.
The chapter on Equiano continues this theme, outlining with some excellent, thoughtfully discussed examples, the bicultural nature of his Narrative.
What is problematic here is the eschewing of the latest critical edition (1995
Carretta) that leads to several minor factual errors. Moreover, there is no mention of the controversial Carretta scholarship that questions Equiano’s African
patrimony (Carretta in Slavery and Abolition 1999). In calling on Equiano’s African background to describe his ‘‘subtle synthesis of African belief systems
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with dissenting traditions’’ (248), Thomas talks of a rooted African belief system that Equiano gained in Africa. Carretta’s latest scholarship would not
downgrade the existence of such a belief system, but would hint at a more
rooted religious tradition Equiano had imbibed in his boyhood from unacculturated Africans in the Carolinas. The latter would make Thomas’s arguments
for a creolized and hybrid text all the stronger as the ‘‘continuum’’ of belief in
the Diaspora she talks of, is exemplified in Equiano’s life-history.
Thomas’s book is at its most successful in dealing with issues of gender.
She rightly describes how ‘‘(Mary) Wollstonecraft’s discussion of female subjugation rested fundamentally upon the dynamics of emancipatory and abolitionist discourse’’ (87). Wollstonecraft’s feminist argument stressed how
women’s worth was valued on her ‘‘external and reproductive potential’’ (87)
just like the slaves’. The omission of Mary Prince, then, is baffling as her early
nineteenth-century life, narrated in a lively autobiography could have provided a more radical intervention in female discourse about slavery than Philis
Wheatley’s rather anodyne verse. Maybe its 1831 date precluded Thomas’s use
of the text, though the fact that many of the incidents related happened well
before 1830, would surely qualify it as a dynamic exemplar of black women’s
survival in the period before the abolition of slavery and of questioning the
very system of chattel slavery itself. Gender, though, is used not only to interrogate female-authored texts, but also to problematize a reading of Wedderburn’s radicalism. His claims on his father’s property in Horrors of Slavery
(1824) are shown to be crucially dependent on a proprietorship that has as its
object women slaves. This critique of Wedderburn is well-made and apposite.
Apart from its discussion on gender, another success of the book is the
excellent work here on the importance of the spiritual element in slave narratives, not in purely Christian salvational terms, but the ways in which the
‘‘ ‘discourse of the spirit’ provided the slaves with an effective (‘creolised’)
mode of subversion, a persuasive counter-hegemonic mode of articulation via
which the culturally hybrid consciousness of a black diaspora could emerge’’
(153). A more sustained discussion of slave religion as practiced in the Caribbean or the American South would have strengthened this observation, but
then, as I have discussed, the book is strangely shy of ethnography.
On Coleridge, Thomas usefully quotes his pamphlet on the trade and
stresses the way it ‘‘daringly correlated the volatile insurrections and ‘justified
rebellions’ of West Indian slaves in the colonies with the desperate plight of
the British peasantry’’ (95). However, her contention that he ‘‘strategically
avoided a discussion of the slaves themselves’’ (95) is wrongheaded, because
his very talking of British peasants and slaves in the same breath makes the
much more important political point that exploitation by the rich of the poor
is a worldwide phenomenon that requires more than philanthropy to overturn
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it. This is a point Wedderburn was to return to with a vengeance in his writings and speeches a decade later.
Wordsworth is taken to task for his family’s involvement in the slave
trade—receiving ‘‘material benefits . . . from participants in the slave trade’’
(112) like the Bristol merchant John Pretor Pinney whose house he stayed in
rent-free; but again opportunities to use excellent resources are eschewed.
Thus Dorothy Wordsworth’s wonderful line on John’s trip to Barbados—‘‘How
we are squandered abroad!’’ (195)—is buried in the footnotes when it could
have been used to rhetorically interrogate Dorothy and William’s complicity
in the British imperial project. However, some of the strongest arguments in
the book occur in this chapter where Wordsworth’s conservatism on the issue
is first accurately read in a range of poetic examples and then is contrasted
markedly to the position of other writers, like William Blake.
Overall, Thomas’s book radically challenges traditional notions of the relations between Romanticism and race. If sometimes its postcolonial rhetoric
rather runs ahead of due regard to context, this does not undermine its major
contention (following Hortense Spillers et alia) that race mattered fundamentally in the period and was used to determine the place of whiteness and maleness as much as blackness and femininity. In a similar gesture to Paul Gilroy’s,
she identifies diaspora as key to the development of a unique black consciousness that affected black and white identities describing ‘‘the ocean as a trope
of the diaspora itself, a ‘no man’s land’ or middle passage in which ‘identity’
becomes amorphous and in which epistemological boundaries and cultural
ideologies are subjected to processes of instability, transition and miscegenation’’ (244). Her book, then, despite its faults, is a dynamic contribution to
a developing intercultural field of inquiry that means traditional concepts of
Romanticism are under severe challenge.
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The Notorious Astrological Physician of London: Works and Days of Simon Forman
by Barbara Howard Traister. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago
Press, 2001. Pp. 250. $30.00.
Poor Simon Forman. History has not served him well. He was falsely,
posthumously implicated in the scandalous murder of Sir Thomas Overbury,
an event which took place a full two years after his own death. The caricature
of Forman that emerged from Frances Howard’s trial was that of a nefarious,
aphrodisiac- and poison-dispensing practitioner of the evil arts, if not even the
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devil himself. In his afterlife, Forman was never able to shake this reputation,
and for the next couple of centuries he became a recurring character in poems
and novels, even crossing the Atlantic to serve as the model for Hawthorne’s
insidious Chillingsworth in The Scarlet Letter. Literary scholarship has not
helped his case. A. L. Rowse’s biography, Simon Forman: Sex and Society in
Shakespeare’s Age (London, 1974), depicts him as a sort of early modern pervert. More recently, Louis Adrian Montrose’s canonical essay, ‘‘ ‘Shaping Fantasies’: Figurations of Gender and Power in Elizabethan Culture’’ (Representations
2 [1983]) springs from Forman’s erotic dream about Queen Elizabeth. Montrose’s article, while acknowledged as brilliant, is often disparagingly employed as a synecdoche for the first-wave new historicist tendency to rely on
anecdotal history, and ‘‘Simon Forman’s dream’’ has even become a synecdoche for Montrose’s article itself. In fact, it could be said that within literary
history Forman has only been permitted to function synecdotally: he stands
for the corruption of the court, for the quirks of the early modern sex life, for
the seventeenth-century culture of witchcraft, for the historical archive.
In her fascinating study of Simon Forman’s own writings, The Notorious
Astrological Physician of London: Works and Days of Simon Forman, Barbara
Howard Traister assembles the parts back into a whole. A look at the book’s
bibliography of manuscript sources reveals the depth of materials that went
into producing a revived and revitalized Forman; a survey of the reproduced
manuscript sections and the extensive quotations suggests an archive that is
daunting for its paleography and even more so for its orthography. This is a
serious academic undertaking, one requiring a profound depth of cultural
knowledge, archival skill, dedication and patience.
The result of Traister’s extensive labor is a gripping page-turner. The
reader comes not only to know Simon Forman, but to explore his eclectic interests and his cultural milieu. The book wends its way through curious facts,
and the result is part biography, part medical and social history, and even part
Alice in Wonderland (at one point we find ourselves unexpectedly in the world
of giants, at another we watch Forman drinking a sort of boiled snake soup as
an elixir to reverse the effects of aging).
The Simon Forman that Traister reconstructs is not necessarily a very nice
one. Forman emerges as a ‘‘humorless, anxious man trying desperately to become something he was not’’ (30). In some ways, Forman’s story is one of selffashioning gone bad. In his various autobiographies (themselves testament to
‘‘A Self-Conscious Life,’’ as Traister entitles a chapter), Forman fantasizes about
familial and social grandeur, even drafting several coats of arms. This social
elevation did not correspond with the reality of Forman’s existence, however.
Of relatively humble origins, Forman was largely denied a formal education.
While he received some instruction from a clergyman as a child, after his
father’s death he was apprenticed to a shopkeeper who did not honor an
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agreement to send the young Simon to grammar school, a breach which
Forman bitterly resented and long remembered. Forman sopped up what
knowledge he could by pressing a dim schoolboy sharing his quarters to repeat the daily lessons. This dynamic was one that would repeat itself throughout Forman’s life: yearning to be inside of a formal system, aware of his own
intelligence and capacities, and yet excluded from the system through the
prejudice and injustice of his intellectual inferiors (as he perceived it). The
most significant and enduring of Forman’s struggles to be an insider was his
long campaign to be licensed by the exclusive College of Physicians. This
struggle involved repeated imprisonment, failed public examinations, and the
influence of Forman’s better-placed friends. In the end, Forman prevailed but
his relationship with the physicians was fraught and psychologically complex;
even as Forman seemed to loathe the medical organization, he was nonetheless
desperate to be accepted and even ordered a set of clothes to correspond to
the physician’s dress code. While Forman eventually secured himself a solid
reputation and some degree of wealth, he remained a social outsider. His compulsive attempts to shape his life and family history could not overcome this
exclusion.
In his personal life, Forman seems to have been largely friendless. ‘‘All too
often,’’ writes Traister, ‘‘people disappointed, betrayed, or angered Forman’’
(172). He was deeply suspicious of others, and even thought that people were
out to kill him. He was convinced his mother hated him. With the exception
of one adulterous passion, his relationships with women appear to have been
emotionally distant, if enthusiastically sexual. Forman had abundant extramarital sexual encounters (preferring women who were married or promiscuous so paternity claims could be denied or concealed), and Traister even speculates that he accepted sexual payment for medical services rendered, a
speculation that seems plausible and even likely. The portrait that emerges
from this book is unflattering, but is tempered by some of Forman’s more endearing quirks. We catch glimpses of Forman writing (bad) poetry, indulging
his active imagination in chivalric lore, and developing a penchant for gardening in later life. And if Forman’s relationship with other humans were rather
dispassionate, his heart was faithful to his books, which he cherished to the
point of renting a second set of chambers to house and protect them. Lost lovers and lost children rarely figure in his accounts—but lost books are
mourned, and their return marked with rejoicing.
While Forman makes an intriguing, even novelistic central character for
the book, perhaps even more interesting is the social world that we glimpse
through him. While the autobiographic writings attempt to script a particular
(usually victimized) persona, the casebooks appear to chart a routine day’s
labor and record factual information. These casebooks, however, contain particles of hundreds of other narratives of loss, suffering, and desire. We read of
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illness and desperate attempts to cure it, or of resignation to its effects. Many
of Forman’s consultations were with relatives or friends of the suffering person, rather than the patients themselves, an angle which somehow makes the
illness more vivid. Scholarly accounts of early modern medicine most often
linger over the grotesque details of disease (Forman’s account of the man who
had finger-sized holes in his neck filled with eighty-six worms would make a
nice candidate for these studies), but Traister’s unfolding of Forman’s writings
brings to light the repercussions for the caregivers. Many of Forman’s clients
came to him for astrological rather than medical advice (a distinction which
Forman himself would have considered false, for astrological knowledge was
vital to his practice as a physician). These astrological consultations also provide a glimpse of Londoners’ affective lives. One desperate couple repeatedly
visits Forman hoping to find a lost and clearly much beloved pet dog (one
wearing a velvet collar with bells); a widow and her two suitors consult
Forman to know which of the pair she is to marry. From the records of
Forman’s practice the reader encounters an affective economy that is at times
poignantly familiar, and at times utterly alien.
One of the ironies of Traister’s book is its title, The Notorious Astrological
Physician of London, since Forman emerges as a figure who was not really notorious within his own lifetime. His repeated and flagrant disregard for the College of Physicians did indeed make him subject to periods of imprisonment,
but the overall impression the reader carries from Traister’s study is of an antisocial but well-respected medical practitioner. The people who came to see
Forman were not courtiers or, so far as we know, scheming murderers. Forman
himself was not dispensing aphrodisiacs or abortives. But while the reader expecting notoriety and sensationalism may be disappointed, the study is all the
more intriguing for its commonality. Through Forman, we meet a cross-section of ordinary Londoners, and Forman himself functions as an exemplary
reader and interpreter of the political circumstances of his day. He was intrigued by the nascent English explorations of the New World, apparently fascinated by Essex (repeatedly performing astrological readings to see how
Essex’s schemes would fare—and correctly predicting disastrous results), and
did indeed dream about the Queen, although only one of his recorded dreams
about her was at all risqué. While Forman was only one individual, and an
extraordinary one at that, it is nonetheless interesting to see how an inhabitant
of the city might have been engaging with the current events that are of primary interest for many historians and literary scholars.
The book is also a marvelous insight into the nuts and bolts of medical
practice. Recent scholarly interest in the body has led to an increased awareness of early modern medical theories (such as the humoral economy) and
practices (like the culture of dissection). But it remains difficult to imagine
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how the medical culture actually affected the lives of the people living in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century London. Here, in Forman’s records, we are
able to see early modern medicine at work. We read how physicians were paid
(part upon receipt of services, part upon the recovery of health). We get a feel
for how many patients a doctor, or at any rate Forman, would see in a day
(about four). We learn the most common ailments (gynecological problems
were especially prevalent), and the demographic breakdown of patients (relatively few children and people over 50, more women than men). An odd aggregate effect of this book, at least for this reader, is that the idea and practice
of humoral (and to a lesser degree astrological) medicine begins to emerge as
a logical and sensible system. Extensive reading in medical history can explain
the principles of the humoral economy, but the concept and the cures often
continue to look bizarre to the modern eye. Through encountering Forman’s
patients and diagnoses, however, the system becomes much more comprehensible, as does the early modern somatic subjectivity.
Traister’s study does not present us with any new theoretical paradigms
for reading early modern culture. Nor does it pretend to. But in providing
such an extensive account of Forman’s ‘‘works and days’’ the book is an incredible entry into the world of early modern medicine and life of one of its
practitioners. As a work of scholarship Traister’s work is profound and invaluable, and as a book a great romp of a read.
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Jean Toomer and the Harlem Renaissance edited by Genevieve Fabre and Michel
Feith. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2001. Pp. 256. $52.00 cloth;
$22.00 paper.
The Evidence of Things Not Said by Lawrie Balfour. Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 2001. Pp. 192. $17.50 paper.
In his dedication to the posthumously published Juneteenth, Ralph Ellison
eulogizes ‘‘That Vanished Tribe into Which [he] Was Born, / The American
Negroes.’’ As culled from over 2,000 manuscript pages by his literary executor,
John McCallahan, Juneteenth, like Invisible Man, traces the extinction of Alain
Locke’s ‘‘New Negro’’ by forces both intrinsic and extrinsic to the former Africans, not the least of which is the phenomenon of ‘‘passing,’’ a Trojan Horse
strategy that straddles the boundary between the intraracial and the interracial
as simultaneous self-extinction and transcendence. Following a line of thought
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already displayed by the accessorized identities of Rinehart in Invisible Man,
Ellison’s posthumous send-up of ethnic and racial machinations demonstrates,
à la Faulkner, Fitzgerald, Morrison and others, that ‘‘passing’’ is the sine qua
non of what it means ‘‘to be’’ an American. Thus, to a certain extent, Juneteenth
can be read as an appended chapter to Jean Toomer’s Cane, a book which, as
Werner Sollors notes in his contribution to a new collection of essays on
Toomer, analogously depicts the ‘‘disappearing African culture on the American continent.’’ And if Ellison’s work also foretells the coming ‘‘black’’ man,
those ‘‘race men’’ whom Toomer had to both embrace and repel, James Baldwin’s work in toto relentlessly puts ‘‘black men’’ on stage in order to both gape
at and gaze beyond them. For Toomer and Baldwin, these reactions to the dilemma of race and racism in America add up to Ellisonian ambivalence, the
theses and antitheses of twentieth-century America in the throes of giving
birth to America ‘‘tomorrow,’’ when men will one day live as they have been
created, as equals.
But not, necessarily, women. In these essays that reassess the value and
position of Jean Toomer’s work and life in relation to the Harlem Renaissance
in particular and modernism in general, the question of gender is never addressed explicitly. The absence is significant because Toomer weds his vision
of the coming America to the ‘‘new race,’’ those of mixed racial and ethnic
blood. Although contributor Diana Williams oversimplifies Toomer’s endorsement of general eugenics tenets in the early part of the twentieth century,
Toomer’s reversal of the hierarchical oppositions undergirding value-laden racial theories—‘‘pure’’ blood v. ‘‘mixed’’ blood—is, as she notes, a kind of ‘‘natural aristocracy.’’ Insofar as this ‘‘aristocracy’’ depends on women as well as
men, to say nothing of the cultural apparatus of heterosexual norms, feminist
and queer readings of Toomer seem justified. Nonetheless, in Jean Toomer and
the Harlem Renaissance, Williams and twelve other critics examine Toomer’s
life and work in almost every other important (and not so important) context:
the other arts (music and painting), modernity as a cultural force, the political
ramifications of Cane as well as Toomer’s nonfiction work, and the marketing
problems around Cane given Toomer’s reluctance to have himself blurbed as
a ‘‘Negro author.’’ The range of topics ensures that most, if not all, readers of
Toomer will find at least one essay of interest in this collection.
For this reader’s part, the most illuminating essays, aside from Williams’s,
are those by George Hutchinson, Charles-Yves Grandjeat and Michael Soto.
All three depict the paradoxical struggles of Toomer’s desire to establish himself as a writer per se (that is, as an ‘‘American’’), his resistance and acquiescence to the racial pigeonholing of his supporter Waldo Frank and publisher
Horace Liveright (the ironies of their surnames notwithstanding), and his attempt to overcome racial fixation in Cane even as he confesses that his inspiration for artistic creativity is drawn from, and privileged by, ‘‘the Negro group.’’
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Certainly Hutchinson is attuned to this delicate balancing act when he notes
that Toomer’s utopian visions of mixed-race relations take shape within the
context of an increasing number of cultural and political clashes within the
nation. In short, Toomer looks to a future America as the country becomes
even more racially polarized than it had been at his birth in 1894. More ironic,
and on point, Cane was largely ignored, despite mostly glowing (if problematic) reviews, and disappeared shortly after its publication until it was ‘‘resurrected’’ in the 1960s by the race-conscious purveyors of ‘‘black aesthetics,’’ the
‘‘foundation’’ of the Black Arts Movement.
As the focus here is Toomer in the context of the Harlem Renaissance, the
essays in general move back and forth between discussing Toomer’s ambivalent relationship to the implications of the ‘‘new Negro’’ (Wolfgang Karrer links
this ambivalence to that of Claude McKay who, for very different reasons, also
resisted the implications of Locke’s clarion call) and the ways that Cane embodies formal features and thematic elements associated with modernism
(e.g., collage, fragmentation, nostalgia, rootlessness, etc.). Charles-Yves
Grandjeat argues, for example, that Toomer’s use of secondary colors depicts
the ‘‘in-between’’ that stands outside or beyond the language of binary oppositions. Genevieve Fabre reads the linguistic structures of Cane against musical
and theatrical backdrops while the essays by Werner Sollors and Michel Fabre
suggest Toomer’s restless spirit not only led him to wager his life on an
America yet to be born but, in important ways, led him to embrace internationalism on all levels, yet another tenet of modernism. Or perhaps being a
member of the ‘‘new race’’ simply meant, for Toomer, that he was both the
‘‘First American’’ (as he entitled a polemical essay) as well as the last American,
a man no longer delimited by ‘‘history.’’
If Jean Toomer saw himself as a kind of mosaic figure atop the mountain
of history, gazing into a future he would never enter, James Baldwin saw himself, and lived his life, as a fiery Jeremiah, denouncing white and black Americans who failed to seriously examine, and accept with compassion, their
shared, checkered, past. In a new book that considers the political economy
of race consciousness as it pertains to the ideals of American democracy, Lawrie Balfour argues that Baldwin’s work in toto can be read as a saying of the
unsaid, a deliberate refusal of the polite civility of silence that paradoxically
underwrites the American discourse on race. Still, for all his hardnosed takes
on American democracy, Baldwin, like Toomer and Ellison, linked his vision
of what America could be with the development of a certain moral quality
within all Americans. Baldwin, as Balfour shows, eschewed talk of transcending race à la Toomer; he wanted to highlight race since, he believed, race had
never been seriously discussed in America. Yet because he believed American
democracy could be fully realized without erasing race, Baldwin was actually
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more optimistic—and less idealistic—than Toomer regarding the prospects for
blacks in America.
Balfour begins by insisting on the relevance of all of Baldwin’s work, both
‘‘early’’ and ‘‘late’’ since, she argues, her concerns do not address the thorny
issue of aesthetic value that is often used to denigrate Baldwin’s later, largely
political, books. But it soon becomes clear that there is one genre of Baldwin’s
work that Balfour largely neglects: his fiction. And she does so not only or
primarily due to the nature of her sociopolitical orientation but also because,
I believe, Baldwin’s fiction, no more than Ellison’s, could deliver on the promise the nonfiction envisions. Baldwin, like Ellison, was too shrewd a writer, too
experienced a human, to sugarcoat the raw reality of race as experienced by
those deemed ‘‘ethnic groups.’’ Most significant, in their fiction both writers
consider and dismiss almost all the ‘‘solutions’’ proposed from every segment
of the political spectrum (excepting, of course, their much-heralded, and very
problematic, championing of ‘‘individualism’’). And Baldwin, like Ellison, held
onto the promise of America even as they conceded the failures of ‘‘integration’’ while depicting the dead-ends of segregation.
Balfour’s book, then, considers the political economy of race as analyzed
by Baldwin in the essays, with occasional glances at the fiction. After an introductory chapter Balfour views Baldwin’s work largely through three interrelated problems: the question of what she calls ‘‘race consciousness,’’ the very
problematic relationship between victimhood and martyrdom, and the polarization of white and black Americans into havens of ‘‘innocence’’ and camps
of ‘‘guilt.’’ The last chapter, significantly entitled ‘‘The Living Word,’’ represents
what Balfour shares with Baldwin, and what both share with Ellison and (perhaps) Toomer: an unshakable belief in the American Constitution as the Bible
of democratic aspirations.
Though Balfour herself never puts it this way, it becomes clear through
her readings of Baldwin’s essays that he struggled to find a moral language of
analysis that simultaneously resisted the didactic. The effort presented tremendous difficulties for Baldwin. As Balfour notes, Baldwin’s essential problem,
which he shared with other black leaders and intellectuals, was how to perform the ‘‘necessary critique of racial injustice’’ without propagating ‘‘images
of victimhood.’’ It is this dilemma that lies at the heart of Baldwin’s notorious
essay on Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin and Richard Wright’s Native Son, ‘‘Everybody’s Protest Novel.’’ Protest novels, argued Baldwin, merely
reflect, and thus reinforce, the already caricaturized discourse on race: whites
and blacks as either innocent victims or guilty perpetrators of American history. Anticipating the current vogue in ‘‘white studies,’’ Baldwin insists that
‘‘race consciousness’’ must be viewed as essential features of both white and
black Americans. Expanding on Du Bois’s epigrammatic analysis of the ‘‘warring’’ Negro and American ‘‘souls’’ within black Americans, Baldwin demystifies ‘‘whiteness’’ as the naturalized norm against which ‘‘racial progress’’ or
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‘‘regression’’ is measured. Baldwin argues that racial consciousness and its attendant conflicts are normative features of all Americans. Thus, the ‘‘color
line,’’ as a sociopolitical construct, forces all Americans to choose between dissembling (hypocrisy) or rebellion (violence). Yet, precisely because his concern is largely the moral sphere, Baldwin, as Balfour notes, can neither suggest
how ‘‘whiteness’’ is to be accepted as a construct by whites nor ‘‘imagine’’ how
racial consciousness, even if accepted, is to be non-hierarchical in the America
yet to be born. This explains, in part, the dark, despairing tone so evident in
the late work.
Baldwin’s interest in the moral sphere has its plusses, as Balfour shows.
For one thing, Baldwin, unlike the early King and other civil rights activists
and supporters, was never taken in by the attempt to legislate ‘‘arbitrary beliefs’’ into existence as a sign of ‘‘racial progress.’’ Balfour correctly notes that
Baldwin saw this strategy for what it was: an attempt to ‘‘divide’’ and ‘‘showcase’’ successful blacks as individual ‘‘examples’’ of what unsuccessful blacks
should be. Baldwin’s class analysis of the civil rights movement follows Du
Bois in demonstrating how the ‘‘private’’ realm of black Americans—the ‘‘warring souls’’ of the ‘‘Negro’’ and ‘‘American’’—can be read as an analogue to the
‘‘public’’ realm. But in Baldwin class eventually gives way to morality, as a
means to an end, and so he argues, like Ellison, that the all-too-visible and alltoo-invisible black American is forced to make immoral choices: again, dissembling (hypocrisy) or rebellion (violence). As applied to all Americans,
Baldwin’s analysis is linked to an Ellisonian vision: the fate of America and
African Americans are inextricably bound. As to African Americans, Baldwin,
like Ellison, Albert Murray and others, weds victimhood to martyrdom: ‘‘the
memory of the auction block’’ is the matrix for ‘‘the gift of insight.’’ Thus black
Americans have a ‘‘more mature aspiration toward freedom and equality’’ than
their white counterparts. As in Ellison, then, African Americans, by virtue of
their ‘‘peculiar history,’’ are the seeds of the America still to come. It is this
teleological dimension in Baldwin that allows him, as it does all moralists, to
circumvent the problem of infrastructural (that is, sociopolitical) change. It is
also why, as Balfour notes, Baldwin waffles on the private/public problem. Is
racial consciousness essentially a ‘‘private’’ problem of morality or a ‘‘public’’
problem of ethics? As Balfour shows, almost unwittingly, Baldwin is clearly
concerned about the latter even as his writings drive home the priority of the
former.
In two passages in her book Balfour notes, almost in passing, two problems regarding Baldwin’s language. Balfour doesn’t connect them but I believe
they dramatize the limits of moral persuasion as deployed by Baldwin. At the
end of the second chapter Balfour comments on Baldwin’s confrontation with
gay and lesbian issues. On the one hand, as Balfour notes, Baldwin insisted on
the fluidity of sexual identity, the androgynous nature of all human beings,
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positioned against the ubiquity of what Balfour calls the ‘‘heteronormative.’’ At
the same time, Baldwin insisted that the question of his own sexuality, like
that of other public figures, was essentially a pre-political, private, issue. Thus,
in chapter three, Balfour notes that though Baldwin was protective of his privacy, he recognized that the private realm impinged upon the public, that ‘‘the
intangible dreams of people have a tangible effect on the world.’’ What, then,
is one to think about Baldwin’s language, masculinist in its assumptions from
beginning to end? For Baldwin insisted that the ‘‘problem’’ of race in America
was largely a problem of men, black and white. Balfour explains these tensions, along with the general diminishment of nuance and ambivalence in his
work, as a sign of Baldwin’s attempts to remain ‘‘relevant’’ within the increasing black militancy of the sixties and seventies. I believe, however, that Baldwin’s insistence on the priority of morality over ethics, and both over politics,
led him, and others (including Balfour), to reify the ‘‘private’’ realm however
much they interrogate, and acknowledge, its complex relationship to the public. It is interesting to note in this context that Balfour plays Baldwin off against
contemporary moralists like Shelby Steele and Michael Walzer, both of whom
deploy metaphors of ‘‘innocence’’ and ‘‘guilt,’’ ‘‘home’’ and ‘‘religion,’’ in their
musings on American race problems. Their domestications of race, race as primarily a moral, secondarily an ethical, problem, situate sociopolitical influences ‘‘outside’’ the sphere of racial consciousness, a move which, for all his
differences from them, is analogous to Baldwin’s projection of an undetermined future America where heightened racial consciousness levels the playing field of ‘‘innocence’’ and ‘‘guilt,’’ ‘‘stranger’’ and ‘‘native.’’
Is it fair to conflate these religious categories onto Baldwin’s variegated
lexicon? I believe so, especially since Balfour herself refers to Baldwin’s distinctions between the ephemeral and the ‘‘constant.’’ If ‘‘money, or power’’ are examples of the former and ‘‘birth and death’’ examples of the latter, this
distinction is true only in the ‘‘long run.’’ In the short run, however, of lived
history, the ephemeral—say, racism—can take on the appearance of the constant. Baldwin dubs this a ‘‘chimera,’’ but he can only do so from the longdistance perspective of ‘‘democratic possibility.’’ Thus Balfour: ‘‘Baldwin recognizes that the constitution of the United States is itself undefined territory
whose contours cannot be mapped in advance of social change’’ (137). The
Ellisonian echoes are unmistakable; Balfour’s ‘‘undefined territory’’ recalls Ellison’s ‘‘going to the territory,’’ which is itself a straight gloss on Twain’s ambivalent ‘‘territory’’ invoked at the end of Huckleberry Finn. The utopian impulses
in James Baldwin, in Jean Toomer, like those in Ralph Ellison, Albert Murray,
could be called ‘‘hope’’ were this word merely ahistorical, merely another
name for some future ‘‘America.’’ But as the essayists in Jean Toomer and the
Harlem Renaissance and Lawrie Balfour in The Evidence of Things Not Said demonstrate, however unwittingly, ‘‘hope’’ has a specific historical resonance in the
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sociopolitical climate of American racial violence. It may well resonate with a
word all these authors have written against. Call it despair.
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The Melancholy of Race: Psychoanalysis, Assimilation, and Hidden Grief by Anne
Anlin Cheng. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2001. Pp. ix Ⳮ 271.
$29.95.
The Melancholy of Race should be read both for its acumen and for its politics. The book’s discussion of ‘‘racial melancholia’’ clarifies the psychological
terms organizing the dynamics of race and what politics can be voiced based
on those dynamics. In other words, Anne Anlin Cheng’s book provides vocabulary for understanding the invisible aspects of race, particularly racial subjection, which tends to be ignored by the conventional politics of claiming
grievances against racial injustice. Cheng wants us to pause on the important
psychoanalytic distinction between grievance and grief and in so doing allow
for the rethinking or retheorizing of the terms through which race is represented as well as experienced.
One might criticize Cheng for narrowing her discussion to two race categories—Asian American and African American—even while she mentions Native American and Latino as sidebars, but I see her choice as ‘‘strategic.’’ With
reference to Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s notion of ‘‘strategic essentialism,’’
Cheng is quite wary of facile race categories, selecting Asian American and African American for their historically situated positions in hegemonic conceptualizations of the American nation, especially in current dialogues on race. The
black-white dyad dominates American talk on race domestically; when attention turns international, Asians versus whites dominate:
With black and white as the dominant racial categories, historical
memory tends to overlook the fierce contestation over the shades, as
it were, in between—conflicts that involve not just ideological differences but economic and social privileges. Indeed, the formulation of
the government’s sovereign power to exclude is historically tied to
the definitions of aliens and citizens. Well before Brown, there was a
series of key rulings in school segregation, in addition to the wellknown Plessy v. Ferguson, that involved the problem of racializing
Asians in this country. . . . [In fact,] during the Brown litigations, the
constitutionality of racialization-as-segregation in the form of Japanese internment (Korematsu v. U.S.) was relegitimated on the grounds
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that ‘‘national security’’ was at stake . . . the history of virulent racism
against Asians and Asian Americans has been at once consistently upheld and denied. Shuttling between ‘‘black’’ and ‘‘white’’—the Scylla
and Charybdis between which all American immigrants have to
‘‘pass’’—Asian Americans occupy a truly ghostly position in the story
of American racialization.
(22–23)
The ghostly characterization is apt for a racial category that tends to be obscured by black and white grievances against each other’s racial positions.
However, Asians and Asian Americans are not merely obscured; they are also
used to discipline other racialized groups, especially blacks. Through the
‘‘model minority’’ figure, Asian Americans are used to deny black loss and sorrow by accusing blacks of not assimilating as successfully as Asian counterparts. Asian Americans are thus made to embody both ‘‘praises of the
American way’’ and the failure of African Americans to succeed as citizens. To
move beyond the superficiality of who suffered more or who succeeds more,
Cheng invites consideration of the psychological processes through which
subjects deal with nationally imposed contradictory categories of race and citizenship.
In other words, Cheng helps reiterate what many race theorists including
Spivak know to be illusory about racial categories while turning attention from
causes of subjection (e.g., interpellation—or being hailed as an object of racial
injustice—by collective memories of slavery, the holocaust, internment) to the
effects of subjection on the racialized individual as he or she imagines a group
identity with relation to the nation. The strategic value of Cheng’s focus becomes clear as she explains the failure of grievance to exact racial healing.
Grievance only is the guise of political action (173) that, as has been charged
by white opposition, often sounds like whining or vengeful retribution. Cheng
recognizes, exhibiting rare compassion, that ‘‘public grievance is a social
forum and luxury to which the racially melancholic minorities have little or
no access’’ (174). Such a statement has direct bearing on Asian Americans who
are often rendered invisible by racial dialogue dominated by white/black oppositions. And the caution against grievance is clearly addressing the current
backlash against the so-called ‘‘race card’’ sounded during the O. J. Simpson
trial and in recent anti-affirmative action lawsuits based on charges of ‘‘reverse
discrimination.’’ What term captures the complex emotions and experiences
that the act of grievance attempts to address but fails to recognize?
Cheng makes a strong case for considering melancholia as the term that
best approaches effects of racial subjection and helps put those effects into
critical dialogue. Unlike recent popular notions of hybridity and multiplicity
(e.g., Homi Bhabha, Iain Chambers), melancholia addresses ‘‘the fundamental
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processes of identification’’ (26) without reproducing the too familiar
essentialism/anti-essentialism opposition, ‘‘an illusory opposition [that] has
been established between hybridity and essentialism, as though the former
cures the latter; as though differences of class, gender, and nationality eliminate essentialist positions when clearly those different positions are themselves
each affecting their own brands of allegiances, each demanding an ‘identity’ ’’
(26). Cheng’s turn to psychoanalysis is due to an important recognition:
What has been missing in much of the critical analysis of race relations and representations has been a willingness to confront the psychic implications of the haunting negativity that not only has been
attached to but has also helped to constitute the very category of ‘‘the
racialized.’’ The truth is that race studies turns with more comfort to
sociology, anthropology, and history rather than literature or philosophy. This discomfort has everything to do with an abiding attachment
to the notion that we have to talk about racial subjects as ‘‘real’’ subjects. This tendency is not hard to understand since dehumanization
has long been the tool of discrimination. The problem, however, is
that in trying to compensate for that history, we often sacrifice discussions of all the immaterial, pressing, unquantifiable elements that go
into the making of ‘‘reality’’ and end up with a very narrow definition
of what constitutes ‘‘material’’ history.
(25–26)
Melancholia allows Cheng to map racial fantasy into identification as that
which combines the individual (psyche) with the social (ideological state apparatus) (164; 167–168). Locating racial fantasy as the bridge between individual and state allows her to supplement Althusser’s theory of interpellation
which a needed accommodation of the specificity of racialization. The subject
of racial subjection is not only hailed into being as an object of racism by national narratives or racial injustice but is also the bearer of fantasies of grievance that can enable space for consideration of processes of grief. Cheng is apt
in selecting Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man to illustrate this potential agency in
the narrator’s fantasy of grievance. For Cheng, Invisible Man:
is a seminal text for theorizing invisibility as a trope for the melancholic incorporation of the self-as-loss. If the ideology of ‘‘American
cultures,’’ sustains itself via the repeated exclusion and staged reincorporation of excluded others, then one may begin to read ‘‘racialized America’’ (for both the minority and the dominant subject) as a
fantasy built on absences. It is crucial to recognize that melancholic
identity is built on an incorporative confusion . . . By locating cultural
and racial exclusion as a loss, Ellison’s text offers a theorization of
identity that recuperates that loss not as presence but as invisibility.
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Or, more specifically, Ellison revalues invisibility as a strategy to identify that absence without denying that absence’s constitutive power
for the formation of the racialized subject.
(127–128; emphasis in original)
What is evident, especially in the moments where melancholia is explicitly linked to racial subjection, is that the critic is not merely applying psychoanalysis to perform her own intellectual prowess; Cheng sincerely wants the
work of psychoanalysis to benefit the racialized by providing ‘‘a vocabulary’’
for the invisible experience of racial grief beyond the polemics of grievance.
For as Cheng herself observes, ‘‘focus on injury might be naturalized and used
against the plaintiffs [making claims of racial injustice. It] can be damaging to
say how damaging racism has been’’ (14). That Cheng succeeds, I think, is
evident in her analogy between Asian American experience of assimilation and
hypochondria as a symptom of racial grief. Two literary moments of hypochondria and assimilation are especially illuminating. First, Maxine Hong
Kingston’s autobiographical childhood narrator in The Woman Warrior becomes bedridden for nearly a year after she violently confronts a shy Chinese
classmate who reminds young Maxine of her own racial otherness. The hypochondriac affords Kingston the power to write her grievances against American ideologies of assimilation simultaneous to grievances against Chinese
patriarchal traditions but without simply blaming some figure outside herself.
In attacking a Chinese girl who provides a mirror of her own racial status,
Kingston’s girlhood narrator reveals ‘‘a certain pleasure of subjection at work
in assimilation . . . for what is desired is precisely the eligibility for subjection—
even the eligibility of failure’’ 83). Cheng further explains, ‘‘for the one whose
very status within the nation has been and continues to be attenuated (more
tenuous than African Americans), to vie for the opportunity for comparison is
to participate in the American Dream’’ (83; emphasis in original).
A second analogy between assimilation and hypochondria occurs in
Cheng’s revaluation of Theresa Hak-kyeung Cha’s body of work, particularly
Dictee. Cheng rightfully considers Cha as significant as the figures of Pound,
Olson, and Stein for their assault on ideological narration through formalist
opacity. Like these practitioners of formalism, Cha seems invested in a project
of critiquing the linearity and pretentiousness of historical narration through
fragments, undocumented quotations, and noncontextualized allusions to historical figures. However, Cheng sees Cha’s work as importantly distinguished
from her white counterparts’ because of its postcolonial critique via a personal
history that is impersonal, distant. For Cheng, that Cha ‘‘indicts our very desire
to know and see the ‘other’ through reading—implicates, in fact, our positions
as private, historical, or literary witnesses of submerged historians’’ (150).
‘‘Cha documents not the native but the making of the native’’ (147). Cheng
increases the literary richness of Cha’s incredible work while validating and
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elucidating its strategic importance for rethinking how race is represented and
how race is assimilated, or naturalized within as well as conditioned from
without (160–161). This is especially true of her revaluation of Cha’s poetic
repetition: ‘‘Dictee focuses on the processes that enable group identification by
dramatizing not only how ‘the voice within’ comes into being as an injunction
from without, but also that the injunction without is always already an echo
of something within’’ (158). Dictee dramatizes the desire to repeat, to echo the
external world to make an internal reality.
Through her discussion of Cha’s postcolonial critique by dramatizing how
the voice outside becomes the voice inside, Cheng helps us to rethink Homi
Bhabha’s concept of colonial mimicry, which tends to conceive of the racialized subject as a process of subjection imposed by the colonizer, a kind of collusion with the colonizer in the attempt by the colonized to be affirmed and
valued. Instead of evaluating mimicry as a negative symptom of colonization
(i.e., the racialized subject becoming duped to follow the master), Cheng
wants to consider mimicry as foundational to the very process of subject formation. In this way, Cheng helps detach the idea of race from the reductive
notion of interpellation that treats the oppressed as duped victims of ideology,
oversimplifying the complex process of racialization to coercion. Thus, with
most impressive synthesis of psychoanalytic, postcolonial, and literary theory,
Cheng substantiates her refreshing understanding of mimicry in her quite enlightening reading of Theresa Hak-kyeung Cha’s Dictee, an understanding that
might allow for conceptualizations of the self that is not always already selfincriminating; in other words, a possibility for self-love.
Self-love comes not from grieving, which actually is an expression of hatred for the other that the self needs to exist, but from expressions of grief
(195). We must accept paradoxes as preconditions for social relations, then
think about the task of responding, ethically, to racial injustice without hatred
or competition (193). Turning to self-love has Cheng understandably turn to
Walt Whitman where lyrical roots of American melancholia as political praxis
appear (193–194). Cheng concludes her hopes for love as the potential byproduct of critical examination of racial melancholia with an ironic turn of
phrase that is characteristic of The Melancholy of Race, ‘‘Love look away in order
not to look away’’ (194).
From melancholia to assimilation to identification to love, the psychoanalytic terms dominating each chapter would seem to follow the therapeutic line
of ‘‘working through.’’ Specifically, literary characters that represent various
stages of melancholia, assimilation, identification, or love are either identified
as stuck in grievance or open to grief. For instance, chapter two follows two
interdependent female embodiments of racial melancholia: Linda Low and
Helen Chao; the former is merely fantasy dominated by white ideals of female
beauty while the latter expresses grief over the denial and repression of the
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Asian body. As the two inappropriate-to-marry female choices for the male
protagonist of Flower Drum Song, Linda Low and Helen Chao express the racial
dynamics of beauty in an American culture that would not even allow these
exotic substitutes for American whiteness to marry Chinese. As the transition
from grievance to grief suggests, the organization of the book seems to ‘‘work
through’’ examples of self-hatred, usually voiced as hatred for the other that is
the condition for the naming of the self, toward self-love, or the healthy illusion of being able to identify with the other. In other words, the chapters follow the subject from being stuck in moments of grievance to moments in
which grief becomes a nexus, or keyword, for alternative open-ended understanding of racial injustice as a problem of identity formation. Cheng might be
read as performing a progression from self-hate to self-love, which would
seem contrary to her warnings toward the end of the book against thinking
that she is providing any kind of ‘‘healing’’ or therapy. The apparent contradiction, however, is precisely what I find most appealing. If one understands, as
she argues, healing to be the false promise of the end of suffering, of being
allowed to feel grief after the failure of grievance, then Cheng’s apparent racial
contradiction actually supports her agenda. The kind of hope usually voiced
in terms of ending racism or resolving racial conflicts here underlies the realization that ‘‘ending’’ and ‘‘resolution’’ fail to address or respect the complexities of grief due to racial injustice, and such grievance even reproduces the
very pattern of exclusion on which racism continues its psychic life of power.
The ongoing hope for better race relations, after all, depends on a continuous
open-ended critical discussion of racism that at least seems to be moving in a
positive direction without relying on cliché and reductive logic (i.e., the frustration that fuels the two extreme views voiced in the vernacular as ‘‘race no
longer matters’’ or ‘‘racism will never change’’).
Cheng’s book thus practices some necessary politics: in rethinking the key
psychoanalytic terms of melancholia, assimilation, identification, and love, the
politics of these terms are elucidated (or made available) and reoriented to
help negotiate the tenuous space between a racialized subject and how that
subject experiences grief over racial injustice; in focusing on the process of
racial subjectivation, the reductive oppositions of oppressor vs. oppressed,
state vs. individual, and volunteerism vs. coercion can be replaced with the far
more open-ended and thus creative concern for the unseen feelings and ideas
that try, often unsuccessfully, to express themselves through grievance, or
claims of being wronged. Cheng thus provides a powerful agent against the
charge of ‘‘reverse discrimination’’ voiced, increasingly with legislative and
legal success, by many whites that would deny the historical contribution of
white identity to ongoing racial inequalities.
Peter Kearly
Wayne State University
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Rethinking the Holocaust by Yehuda Bauer. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2001. Pp. 335. $29.95, cloth.
At the second International Conference on the Holocaust and Education,
held at the Yad Vashem Heroes’ and Martyrs’ Memorial authority in Jerusalem,
Yehuda Bauer challenged the current generation of Holocaust scholars to move
beyond the ‘‘memorialization’’ of the event to a study of its effects. This put
Bauer in a difficult position: at the time he was the Director the International
Institute for Holocaust Education at Yad Vashem, which for the nearly forty
years since its founding has served as a reminder and a warning that Jews
should never again be the objects of a Final Solution. In Bauer’s address (and
in Rethinking the Holocaust), he insists that we need to move beyond memory
and ‘‘to rethink the categories and issues that arise out of the contemplation of
that watershed event in human history’’ (ix). But this will be harder than he
thinks, given Bauer’s position as a historian (and a fairly traditional one at
that). Despite positioning himself as an outsider in Holocaust debates—he
often begins paragraphs with phrases like ‘‘contrary to what many of my colleagues think’’—and in spite of the round criticism he levels at as diverse a
cast of characters as Zygmunt Bauman, Daniel Goldhagen and the Lubovitcher
Rebbe, a lot of the work being done on issues surrounding the Shoah and the
Final Solution has moved beyond where Bauer would like it to go.
This is not to say that the book does not provide a good deal of food for
thought. Using mainly secondary sources, but relying also on some of his own
primary research collected over the years in books like Jews for Sale? and American Jewry and the Holocaust, Bauer reconsiders some of his earlier positions,
and some of those reconsiderations are rather surprising. For example, while
he criticizes Goldhagen’s Hitler’s Willing Executioners for a certain amount of
scholarly myopia, he reverses his earlier position and praises Goldhagen’s thesis for forcing scholars to reconsider the blurry line between ‘‘bystander’’ and
‘‘perpetrator,’’ a challenge that Saul Friedlander has taken up in the first volume of his Nazi Germany and the Jews. Bauer also reverses his position on resistance, suggesting his earlier definition of resistance—‘‘any group action
consciously taken in opposition to known or surmised laws, actions or intentions directed against the Jews by the Germans and their supporters’’—was too
narrow. It ignored smaller, individual acts (what he calls amidah, literally
‘‘standing’’ or ‘‘standing up for’’) that sanctify life rather than work actively
against certain destruction, either personal or political. There are other instances—his nod in the direction of women’s studies as a method for understanding the difficult position of women in leadership positions, either in the
resistance or with the Jewish Councils, is notable if weak—and all suggest that
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Bauer, who has been working on the history of the Holocaust for over forty
years, is trying hard to move in a new direction and away from the memorial
impulse. (It’s no surprise, then, that he tells us that he kept his work on this
book a secret to nearly all his colleagues at Yad Vashem; they above all will be
uncomfortable with his retreat from old and familiar positions: Jews resisted
their fate, the state of Israel is the guarantor that no future Holocausts will
occur, and the Final Solution was the direct result of a virulent and not-quitedead central European antisemitism, among others).
Bauer’s reconceptualization of Holocaust scholarship rests on two main
theses, which he advances in the early chapters of the book, and then weaves
through later chapters in which he reconsiders the work of several scholars
(among them Goldhagen, Friedlander, Jeffrey Herf, and Goetz Aly) and several
lines of research (on gender, on the relation between the Holocaust and new
theodicies, the role of resistance and its place in the establishment of the Jewish state in Palestine). The first thesis takes on the question of the uniqueness
of the Holocaust, which is put in doubt with each new set of atrocities (the
Balkans, Rwanda) or reconsideration of older ones (the decimation of native
Americans, the middle passage, Armenia). By Bauer’s lights, the Holocaust
isn’t so much unique as it is unprecedented. While it is a genocide under Raphael Lemkin’s definition (which was in turn picked up by the United Nations
in 1948) because it aimed at the expulsion or destruction of a people, defined
in national, ethnic or religious terms, or its leadership, the destruction of the
European Jews between 1933 and 1945 under the National Socialist regime in
Germany is unprecedented in both its scope and its motivating ideology. What
distinguishes the Holocaust from other genocides, in other words, was the fact
that the former aimed at the destruction of all members of an ethnic/national/
religious group. The Holocaust was also unprecedented in its motivation:
while other genocides were undertaken for what Bauer calls pragmatic ends—
Armenians were killed to quell incipient revolution; native Americans were
killed to open the west; the Muslims in Bosnia were ‘‘cleansed’’ for the purpose
of Serbian territorial integrity—the destruction of the Jews of Europe was the
product of ‘‘a pure, abstract antisemitic ideology in the context of biological
racism.’’ Historically Jews were not a threat to Germany (or anyone else) in
1933: most of the intellectual class was assimilated in varying degrees, and
there was no political center that would have given Jews, as a group, any kind
of national authority. The simple fact that Jews were Jews led to their demotion
from the human to the subhuman, and they were eliminated because they fit
the category: Jews were put to death for the crime of being born, Bauer tells
us. The Holocaust, then, is both particular—it was a crime against Jews—and
universal. Because the monumental crime against the Jews was a crime perpetrated by humans against humans, it is also the most universal of crimes: if it
could happen once in one of the most civilized countries in Europe, surely it
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could happen again. (As in an argument recently and cogently made by Giorgio Agamben, Bauer says that the Holocaust is horrifying not because of its
inhumanity but precisely because of its humanity: the horrible was made possible; the possible was made manifest.)
Bauer’s second thesis is that the Holocaust is not the unfathomable horror—beyond reason—that some scholars have made it out to be. Far from it:
the events had clearly identifiable causes, there is plenty of documentation to
support what we know about them (and there’s more to be had since the
opening of the Soviet archives), and it’s people like Saul Friedlander, Daniel
Goldhagen, and Christopher Browning who have done the most to explain
those events in a language that defies mystification. While it’s true that the
horrors experienced by those who were there cannot be experienced, let alone
known, by those who weren’t, and while it’s true that suffering and its effects
defies representation, we have more than enough information at our disposal
about the Shoah, and it’s that wealth of information that allows Bauer to disagree with other historians. The problem isn’t that we don’t have enough information; it’s that we haven’t found a paradigm in which to make sense—to
produce knowledge—of it, not yet anyway. The biggest obstacle to eventually
producing knowledge of the events is mystification, and chiefest among the
mystifiers is, somewhat surprisingly, Elie Wiesel. (That he should be included
in the same category as the Menachem Schneerson, the Lubovitcher Rebbe
whose responsum to the question of a Holocaust theodicy—it was the fault of
the non-observant and the non-orthodox—takes a well-deserved body blow
in one of Bauer’s strongest chapters, is even more surprising.) While he doesn’t
put it in these terms, Bauer’s complaint about the business of Holocaust mystification comes close to those levelled by Peter Novick in The Holocaust in
American Life (and, to some extent, in Norman Finkelstein’s often-cited but
poorly researched The Holocaust Industry): we’re ignoring what we can learn
from the events while trying to use them as grist for political or academic mills.
(Ironically, in an interview with The Jerusalem Post published in August 2001,
Bauer implies that part of his motivation in writing the book reviewed here
was that he wanted to get something out there while the market was booming
with work on the Holocaust.)
It’s because the Holocaust is explicable that it’s possible to learn from it
(though he suggests historians are notoriously hesitant, or simply unable, to
take that next step). But the lessons Bauer derives from the Shoah—that Jewish resistance was marginal because the conditions that would have allowed
for it were so successfully destroyed by the Germans; that the state of Israel
was both more and less a result of the Holocaust than many make it out to be;
that the conditions in Germany and in the east that provided for the Final Solution were peculiar and vastly more complicated than even Hilberg’s comprehensive treatment allows for—seem oddly low-stakes and uncontroversial.
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Part of the reason for this may be the result, as I suggested earlier, of Bauer’s
position: as an Israeli, as an emeritus director at Yad Vashem, and as an orthodox historian, he is by dint of training and the predicament of location at a
distance from some of the more interesting and transdisciplinary work in the
study of the Shoah. For example, while Bauer is critical of the ideological
stakes that have led the Holocaust to be attached to the history of the partition
of Palestine and the creation of Israel, he doesn’t seem to be willing to pay
attention to why that connection was made in the first place, and the political
and national imperatives that have allowed the Palestinians to manipulate that
history (and the history of the events in Europe and the Middle East between
1933 and 1948) for their own eliminationist ideology. Or, to take another example, while Bauer spends nearly a chapter laying out the paper trail that suggests that the so-called Auschwitz protocols (eyewitness accounts of the
destruction taking place at that camp that were transmitted to the Allies and
the American Jewish community by mid-1944 but which did not precipitate
action to stop the killing) had some influence in Britain and the United States,
the larger question of why this matters is left unanswered. Or, to be fair, that
answer is only hinted at: ‘‘it is better and easier to accuse the Jewish generation
that is no longer alive of having failed to rescue their fellows’’ than it is for this
generation to bear the humiliation of the destruction. The Shoah, he goes on,
‘‘is a social trauma that causes Jews to accuse one another of Nazism’’ and
worse (241).
And here lies the root of the problem: rethinking the history of the Holocaust is one thing; rethinking the Holocaust as it affects history is another. The
event of the Holocaust has not changed one whit as a result—to cite one controversial example—of the Wilkomirski affair, in which a memoir purportedly
written by a child survivor was later proved to be a fabrication. The events
remain the same: just as the ‘‘author’’ of the memoir suggests, Jews from the
Baltic were rounded up, transported to death camps, and eliminated, while a
tiny fraction of them either escaped unharmed or were never caught in the
first place and eventually found names, and histories, to take the place of those
that were lost. What has changed—and what has to be rethought as a result
of the affair—isn’t so much history but history’s afterimage: what made it possible for the vast majority of the reading public to mistake the Wilkomirski
text for history, and how did the language of the memoir, in its replication of
the language of history, allow readers to empathize, or to be traumatized, or
believe they saw the events described? Or consider the more recent controversy surrounding Jan Gross’s book Neighbors, about the burning alive of the
Jews of Jedwabne, Poland, by a group of non-Jewish townspeople. True,
Gross’s historical methodology has been called into question: the documents
he recovered, and the testimonies he has taken, are only the tip of the iceberg,
and to go from that partial reconstruction of events to an accusation that
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neighbors killed neighbors (and here, read ‘‘Poles killed Jews’’) is to take far
too liberal an historical license. But in this case what matters isn’t rethinking
the history of the massacre in Jedwabne—historians will do their work, cooler
heads will prevail, and sooner or later we’ll have the information we need in
order to say with some certainty what happened. What matters is why Gross’s
representation of the events stirred such vehemence among non-Jewish Poles
nearly sixty years after the events.
Moving from testimonies and documents—which Bauer admits are variously interpretable—to the writing of history is always dicey, and is always
subject to revision, reconsideration, and, eventually, better (if not more ‘‘accurate’’) historical accounts. But the work of reconsidering that evidence and the
story built to hold it together always involves accounting for the resonance
history has upon the present. Like memory, in which the past makes itself evident in the present but which is only available as a commingling of past and
present, history involves reckoning with the present. It involves not just mentioning one’s biases up front (as Bauer does) but patiently factoring them into
the historical soup. This work is being done in admirable ways in the United
States by people like Dominick LaCapra, Peter Novick, Alan Berger and Berel
Lang, among others. As Bauer suggested at Yad Vashem three years ago, and
as he tells us in Rethinking the Holocaust, he is well aware that the only way to
resist closing the book on the Shoah and filing it away into cultural memory
so it doesn’t bother us any more is to continually put pressure on the categories that we use to keep it at arm’s length. But because Bauer seems unable to
consider the often traumatic effects of the Holocaust on members of the three
generations born since the events, he can only rethink the Holocaust as history, even as its presence as fact troubles us today.



Michael Bernard-Donals
University of Wisconsin, Madison

Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil by Alain Badiou. Translated by
Peter Hallward. London and New York: Verso, 2001. Pp. 166. $23.00 cloth.
The publication in English of Alain Badiou’s Ethics (originally published
in French in 1998) may come to constitute an ‘‘event’’ in just the sense that
Badiou gives to the concept in his own work: a break with the received ideas
of a given context. As Badiou himself makes clear in the ‘‘Preface to the English
Edition,’’ his Ethics is mobilized by two, not always consistent desires: this slim
volume is at once a critique of the taken for granted ethical culture of the contemporary political and intellectual order and the articulation of a radically different perspective on ‘‘Good and Evil.’’ On the one hand, Badiou has used the
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opportunity of an invitation to write a primer on ethics in order to express his
‘‘genuine fury’’ at the ‘‘moral terrorism’’ of the discourse of human rights and
the new US-directed, ‘‘humanitarian’’ interventionism that it buttresses (liii).
On the other hand, he seeks to develop the practical and ethical consequences
of his philosophical system, which he set out in 1988 in his massive and complex work L’Etre et l’événement (Being and Event—currently under translation).
Badiou’s political critique of the moralization of politics in the post–Cold War
era is an important one, and has been echoed by Slavoj Žižek and others. It
becomes more interesting and original, however, when read from the perspective of his philosophical engagement with discourses of ethics in postwar
thought.
Badiou is probably the most famous French philosopher not to have a
major following in the Anglo-American academy—although this situation is
surely in the process of changing, with several translations recently published
or in the works and with Badiou receiving accolades from Žižek, one of the
great contemporary mediators of French theory. Badiou’s relative anonymity
in the English-speaking world probably results in part from the difficulty of
his thought—which draws heavily on mathematics (especially set theory) as
well as Lacanian psychoanalysis and Althusserian marxism—and in part from
his distinctly un-American political profile as an ex-Maoist and unrepentant
radical militant. For those unfamiliar with Badiou’s work, Ethics makes an excellent starting point. First, the volume is quite accessible, since, as Badiou
remarks, it was originally written for ‘‘a series aimed at secondary-school and
university students’’ (liii)—although I suspect that the less philosophically-oriented American student would probably still have difficulty with it until the
advanced undergraduate level. Second, the book is ably translated by Peter
Hallward, who also provides a clear introduction that situates the argument in
more familiar theoretical terrain, with references to the ethics of Derrida and
Spivak. Hallward also includes a 1997 interview he conducted with Badiou
that is fascinating both for the biographical and political contextualization it
supplies and for the further hints it contains of Badiou’s unusual philosophical
system.
Badiou’s primary philosophical adversary in his Ethics is Emmanuel Lévinas, the Lithuanian-born, French-Jewish philosopher known especially for his
ethics of otherness and his influence on certain versions of poststructuralism.
Badiou’s critique of Lévinas in this brief text will probably seem superficial to
adherents of the latter’s thought. Indeed, it seems that Badiou is less interested
in Lévinas as such than in the general influence he has had on political and
theoretical discourses: Lévinas stands in for the contemporary valorization of
otherness, difference, and victimization as the grounds and stakes of ethics. In
one of Lévinas’s most famous formulations, he writes, ‘‘To see a face is already
to hear ‘You shall not kill,’ and to hear ‘You shall not kill’ is to hear ‘Social
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justice’ ’’ (Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism, trans. Sean Hand [Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990], 8). For Badiou, in contrast, the obsession with human beings’ potential for victimization is a form of nihilism, since
the ‘‘underlying conviction [of this ethics] is that the only thing that can really
happen to someone is death’’ (35). Such a nihilistic perspective will not lead
toward ‘‘social justice,’’ but rather toward apology for actually existing relations of exploitation and domination.
In a further move—which Hallward correctly diagnoses as Badiou’s most
provocative point from the perspective of contemporary doxa—Badiou dismisses outright the very interest of discussions of otherness and difference. It
would not be quite right to say that Badiou is hostile to the aims of the politics
of difference, a perspective often associated with the concept of multiculturalism; rather, he takes cultural and other forms of difference for granted and
demands that we move beyond them if we want to be truly ethical. He writes,
genuine thought should affirm the following principle: since differences are what there is, and since every truth is the coming-to-be of
that which is not yet, so differences are then precisely what truths
depose, or render insignificant. No light is shed on any concrete situation by the notion of the ‘recognition of the other.’ Every modern
collective configuration involves people from everywhere, who have
their different ways of eating and speaking, who wear different sorts
of headgear, follow different religions, have complex and varied relations to sexuality, prefer authority or disorder, and such is the way of
the world. (27)
As these rather sarcastic remarks about cultural difference illustrate, Badiou
strips otherness of any ethical salience and replaces it with a somewhat idiosyncratic notion of truth. I will return to this question of cultural difference,
but for the moment it is important to understand what Badiou means when
he opposes the problem of difference to the question of truth.
A truth is, for Badiou, ‘‘indifferent to differences’’; it is ‘‘the same for all’’ (27;
AB’s italics). How can we situate such a claim in the contemporary theoretical
landscape? Is Badiou’s ethics simply a return to the totalizing and universalizing thought that a combination of historical and intellectual events (the Holocaust, Stalinism, colonialism, postmodernism, etc.) had seemed to render
hopelessly passé? While Badiou’s understanding of truth, and thus also ethics,
is uncompromisingly universalizing, it is also definitively not totalizing. The
interest of his thought today lies precisely in the way he finesses this apparent
paradox.
When Badiou writes that truth is ‘‘the same for all’’ he does not mean that
there is only one truth. To the contrary, truths are irreducibly plural. They are
the product of ‘‘the real process of fidelity to an event’’ (42), and there are an
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infinite number of possible events. Events—to continue using Badiou’s vocabulary—are immanent breaks with a given situation. And a situation is a singular configuration, an ‘‘infinite multiple’’ which can be ‘‘politico-historical,’’
‘‘strictly physical or material,’’ aesthetic, or even defined by the relationship of
two people (129). As the four-fold definition of potential situations implies,
Badiou sees the possibility of truth in the fields of politics, science, art, and
love (this last ‘‘field’’ being one of the most surprising and suggestive in this
self-proclaimed ‘‘anti-humanist’’ thinker). Within a given situation there are
always a number of ‘‘instituted knowledges’’—that is, everyday forms of understanding that Badiou characterizes as ‘‘opinions’’ (cf. 43, 50–1). These
knowledges trace a series of relationships within the situation which can never
be universal (i.e. never attain the level of truth) and which always serve the
given order or power.
Because knowledge serves power (and this is not precisely Badiou’s own
language), there will always be ‘‘voids’’ in a given situation that cannot be
known or thought according to the recognized forms of knowledge. Badiou
links this notion of the unthought in a given reality to Lacan’s notion of the
Real. (One also thinks of the Sartre of Search for a Method.) But there is also a
significant difference between Badiou’s void and Lacan’s Real: while the Real
is never susceptible to transformation (it is the place to which one always returns), the void can be revealed and thus potentially displaced through the
advent of an event (although it is never clear from where the event emerges—
Badiou likens its advent to a non-theological ‘‘grace’’ [122–3]). An event—
whether it involves the production of art, political action, scientific discovery,
or an amorous encounter—reveals what was missing in the given state of the
situation. Once the event has taken place, producing truth entails remaining
‘‘faithful’’ to the event that has revealed the gaps in the situation. The production of truth also constitutes a subject (which, for Badiou, is more an assemblage than an individual), and helps to re-make the opinions and instituted
knowledges of the situation—it is thus fundamentally a form of permanent, if
local, revolution.
How does Badiou move from his notion of truth-processes to the question
of ethics and what he calls the ‘‘ethic of truths’’ [l’éthique des vérités]? In a reversal of what he sees as the contemporary ideology of ethics, Badiou supposes
that good must be posited as coming before evil. The regime of human rights
sees good primarily as a response to an already existing evil; hence, it remains
reactive. Badiou, on the other hand, equates good with the production of
universal truths and argues that evil emerges through the failure of truthprocesses to live up to their universalizing mission. That is, evil emerges either
when a truth is not the same for all, when fidelity to the event is not maintained, or when the truth that has been produced is substituted for the totality
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of the social field. Positing evil as a derailed truth process is helpful in understanding one of the key questions of the twentieth century—how can ordinary
people commit extraordinary acts of evil?—because it demonstrates evil’s
proximity to progressive and potentially liberating human projects. Evil is thus
not easily ghettoized as the other of reason or humanism.
Because of the three possible sources of evil’s emergence, evil is seen as
belonging to one of three genres: it appears as terror, as betrayal, or as disaster.
Terror involves the attempt to produce a truth that does not hold for all. Nazism falls into this category insofar as it constructs an exclusionary imaginary
community, but so would various other communitarian, nationalist, and racist
projects. (Here, Badiou seems close to Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy’s notion of
the ‘‘Nazi myth,’’ which is characterized by a ‘‘will to difference, to distinction,
to individuation.’’ (See Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, Le
mythe nazi [La Tour d-Aigues: Editions de l’Aube, 1991], 62; my translation.)
When a subject does not remain faithful to a truth-process, the second form
of evil, betrayal, results. In scenarios of betrayal, ‘‘former revolutionaries are
obliged to declare that they used to be lost in error and madness,’’ ‘‘a former
lover no longer understands why he loved that woman,’’ or ‘‘a tired scientist
comes to misunderstand, and to frustrate through bureaucratic routine, the
very development of his own science’’ (79–90). Disaster, on the other hand,
follows from the too rigorous application of a truth, the ‘‘absolutization of its
power’’ such that it comes to wipe out entirely the everyday knowledges of the
situation and the ‘‘human animal’’ that constitutes ‘‘truth’s very foundation’’
(84–5).
In what ways are Badiou’s ethical categories useful? What are the limits of
the ethics he articulates? The distinctions between terror, betrayal, and disaster
do help us to differentiate between some of the different forms that historical
evil has taken in recent times. For example, if Nazism seems to represent the
extreme form of terror, Stalinism and the Cultural Revolution might be the
extreme forms of the disaster: the pursuit of a truth that is, unlike the racist’s
truth, addressed to all, and yet which, by virtue of its totalizing application,
wipes out the lifeworlds of its addressees. At the same time, if Nazism and
more run-of-the-mill forms of nationalism are equally examples of terror, what
happens to historical particularity and the scale of ethical judgment? Are betrayal of an amorous encounter, an aesthetic project, a political revolution, and
a scientific insight really comparable in ethical or any other terms? While Badiou performs an important service in revealing the underlying structure of
forms of evil, his categories risk running together practices of radically different sorts. Furthermore, who is to judge whether a particular event is addressed
to all? Is the universal addressee a given or must it also be constructed like the
subject of truth?
Another sort of problem emerges when we consider Badiou’s attempt to
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surpass the discourse of victimization that he and many others see as defining
the contemporary moment. While this critique of victim-centered ethics is
crucial, and works well with respect to many situations, it risks overgeneralization. In his laudable insistence that humanity ‘‘does not coincide with the identity of the victim’’ (11; emphasis in original), Badiou leaves out of his system
the possibility that a human being could be reduced precisely to the status of
victim. Such a case has been investigated by the Italian philosopher Giorgio
Agamben in Remnants of Auschwitz under the heading of the ‘‘Muselmann.’’
Muselmann, or ‘‘Muslim,’’ was the name given in certain Nazi camps to prisoners who had been so overcome by hunger, beatings, etc. that they became
zombie-like, incapable of human communication or response, trapped in an
indeterminate zone between life and death. While surely the product of an
extremity not conducive to generalization, the Muselmann nevertheless constitutes the unthought of Badiou’s own project: the potential of a victimization
so radical that it really does exceed the possibility of any human project or
truth-process. Whether this case is at all conducive to ethical or political elaboration must remain open here, but what the counter-example of the Muselmann suggests is the limit of Badiou’s will to universality.
The problem with universality surely also returns in the insistence on ignoring questions of cultural difference. Badiou’s absolute commitment to the
ethical value of the Same—the fact that truths are addressed equally to all—
demonstrates a provocative and radically democratic spirit. In presenting
truths as simultaneously multiple and universal, Badiou poses an imaginative
answer to what may be the most intractable antinomy of contemporary left
social theory: the difficulty of adjudicating claims for universality and particularlity. (For other attempts to think through this problem, see the contributions to the recent collective volume by Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau, and
Slavoj Žižek, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality [London and New York:
Verso, 2000]. And yet, is his notion that the universality of truths is premised
on the simultaneous local nature of truth—its immanence to a particular situation with which it breaks—sufficient to ward off fears of homogenization, if
not cultural imperialism? How can we differentiate between the Sameness of
truth and the homogenization produced by capitalist commodification? Is
there an alternative formulation that would respect the universal address of
truths while still allowing for a valorization of or commitment to difference?
The unease that Badiou’s dismissal of cultural difference provokes, despite the
freshness of his formulation, suggests that the antinomy of the universal and
the particular is as much a symptom of the post–Cold War historical moment
as a problem solvable in theory.
In addition, given the intractability of the problem, Badiou’s insistence on
the universality (and even ‘‘immortality’’) of truths seems not just a political
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response to neo-liberalism and its ideology of human rights and cultural difference, but also a move in a game of academic identity politics. In other
words, the philosopher’s positing of the existence of universality can also be
read as an intra-academic response to disciplines (and interdisciplines) that
have been associated with claims to difference, such as literary studies, anthropology, and ethnic, cultural, and women’s studies. Such an observation is not
meant to detract from the argument, but rather to demonstrate how it works
on multiple levels: it is at once a rejection of the politics (or rather anti-politics) of the global order; a rejoinder to the domination of the ethics of alterity
in recent philosophy; and a provocation aimed at literary and cultural critics
who instinctively and reactively value difference. It is unlikely that readers will
agree with Badiou on all of these counts, yet his Ethics remains an intervention
that deserves a response. After Badiou, those of us committed to a politics of
difference will need to think difference differently.
Michael Rothberg
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign



Chaos Theory and James Joyce’s Everyman by Peter Francis Mackey. Gainesville:
University Press of Florida, 1999. Pp. xiv Ⳮ 234. $49.95 cloth.
In an early episode of Ulysses, a minor character, Bantam Lyons, asks to
borrow Leopold Bloom’s newspaper. Bantam Lyons mutters about the upcoming Gold Cup race: ‘‘Wait . . . Half a mo. Maximum the second.’’ Bloom tells
him to keep the paper: ‘‘I was just going to throw it away’’ (Ed. Hans Walter
Gabler; New York: Vintage, 1986; episode 5, lines 532–4). Bantam Lyons asks
him to repeat himself. Again hearing the phrase ‘‘throw it away,’’ ‘‘Bantam
Lyons doubted an instant, leering: then thrust the outspread sheets back on
Mr. Bloom’s arms.—I’ll risk it, he said. Here, thanks’’ (5.539–41). During the
chaotic ‘‘Wandering Rocks’’ episode, about halfway through the book, two
other minor characters, Lenehan and M’Coy, briefly discuss how Lenehan has
prevented Bantam Lyons from betting on ‘‘a bloody horse someone gave him
that hasn’t an earthly’’ (10.518–19). Lenehan identifies Bloom as the source of
the tip. Later, Lenehan tells his friends at Barney Kiernan’s pub that Bloom
‘‘had a few bob on Throwaway and he’s gone to gather the shekels . . . Bet you
what you like he has a hundred shillings to five on. He’s the only man in Dublin has it. A dark horse’’ (12.1548–58). When the allegedly enriched Bloom
later fails to stand drinks for the crowd at the pub, a disagreeable nationalist
called the Citizen grows increasingly angry with him. The episode concludes
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with the Citizen throwing an empty biscuit-tin at Bloom and Bloom transformed by the narrator into Elijah ascending to heaven ‘‘like a shot off a
shovel’’ (12.1915).
In his compelling new book on Ulysses, Peter Francis Mackey analyzes the
‘‘Throwaway’’ episode in terms borrowed from ‘‘chaos theory,’’ or the theory
of complex systems. Joyce’s Dublin is a complex social system in which minor
incidents, such as Bloom’s lending the paper to Bantam Lyons, can have magnified consequences. The familiar example from chaos theory is Edward Lorenz’s hypothesis that the flap of a butterfly’s wings in South America could
conceivably cause a tornado in Texas. Mackey writes that ‘‘Moment by
moment . . . Bloom finds himself affected by social contingencies that complicate his life and provide fertile soil for the exponential growth of trivialities
into crises across his community’s common ground’’ (154). Bloom’s (and
Joyce’s) fascination with fate, kismet, continually calls our attention to this
tendency of contingent events to have huge consequences. Moreover, as readers of Ulysses, we stand in something like the position of the interpreters of
huge systems like the weather or the stock market: a seemingly infinite
amount of apparently trivial information needs to be sifted in order for us to
identify an underlying pattern in the novel’s apparent chaos. Earlier novels incorporate apparently chance events into their carefully crafted plots, but Ulysses seems unique in paying such detailed attention to the most random and
insignificant occurrences and in showing how they all ultimately contribute to
what appears retrospectively as a meaningful chain of events.
Some interpreters would argue that Joyce specifically frustrates our attempts to force these random events into meaningful patterns. For example, a
man in a macintosh appears at Paddy Dignam’s funeral and reappears frequently throughout the course of the novel, notably in the ‘‘Circe’’ episode at
the brothel of Bella Cohen. Our readerly attempts to find the identity of the
man in the macintosh resemble those of the reporter Hynes, who mistakenly
records ‘‘Mr M’Intosh’’ as among those who attended the funeral. Joyce’s critics
have vainly sought a meaningful interpretation of the anonymous postcard
that Dennis Breen receives with the message ‘‘U. p.’’ Often enough, Joyce
shows us contingent events that do not apparently lead to magnified consequences.
This objection, however, does not rob the application of chaos theory to
Ulysses of its strength. The central arguments of chaos theory, as Peter Mackey
presents them, do not claim that all events are equally influential. Rather, they
concern the challenges that face interpreters in discovering causal chains
where events are minute and causation is non-linear (or circular). Traditional
thinking about cause and effect tends to assume that a given cause will necessarily have a given effect. But most effects have multiple causes, and frequently
complex systems have ‘‘feedback’’ mechanisms, in which a small change in
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equilibrium will cause a chain reaction that alters many variables. Both the existence of multiple variables, and their continual interaction through feedback
mechanisms, mean that in complex systems chains of causation are practically
unpredictable. Even very sophisticated computer models supplied with huge
amounts of data cannot accurately predict the course of a storm. This does not
mean, however, that the storm cannot be understood causally in retrospect.
Human systems, like the stock market or voting patterns, have similar characteristics and so, according to Mackey, does a day in the life of Leopold Bloom.
Mackey offers an intelligent and accessible introduction to the claims of
chaos theory (which is in fact called ‘‘complex systems theory’’ by its practitioners). Most of the argument relies on seeing Ulysses as analogous to the
complex systems later theorized by physicists and other scientists, but there is
a historical angle to Mackey’s claims. He suggests (unfortunately without any
documentary proof ) that Joyce may have known something of the ideas of the
mathematician Henri Poincaré, one of the intellectual forefathers of chaos theory. Here, as elsewhere, Mackey is developing a link first suggested by Thomas
Jackson Rice, whose excellent study Joyce, Chaos, and Complexity (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1997) placed all of Joyce’s works in the context of
the new sciences from non-Euclidean geometry to Einstein’s relativity. Mackey’s approach is more focused, both in terms of the science he studies (chaos
theory, with little attention, for example to quantum mechanics or the other
theories discussed by Rice) and the text he approaches (Ulysses and not Joyce’s
other writings). Nonetheless, it is a worthy companion to Rice’s work in that
it extends the problem of chaos theory into a very thorough reading of Ulysses
and explores some of the implications of the theory for philosophical issues
like the existence of free will and the validity of postmodernism.
Mackey thus makes an important contribution to the growing field of interdisciplinary studies of science and literature. Having read many scientists’
criticisms of humanistic borrowings from quantum mechanics and the theory
of relativity, Mackey is frank about treating ‘‘chaos theory’’ primarily as a metaphor, but in fact his applications of scientific ideas seem quite rigorous. He is
critical of one of the best-known humanist scholars of chaos theory, Katherine
Hayles, for her ‘‘postmodern faith in . . . absolute subjectivism and relativism’’
(21). Mackey claims that chaos theory, by emphasizing the reality of the real
world (‘‘aboriginal reality’’), refutes postmodernism. However, Mackey remains sensitive to postmodern and neo-pragmatist claims about science as social construction, even if he insists that it is (in words he quotes from Stanley
Fish) ‘‘the best social construction anyone has devised for testing theories
about the world, showing their limits, and coming up with better ones’’ (19).
Mackey emphasizes four aspects of chaos theory that he finds relevant to
our reading of Ulysses:
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1. Small changes, or perturbations, can unpredictably and drastically
alter complex systems.
2. For trivialities to have this influence, extremely sensitive interrelations must exist among the elements of the system.
3. An underlying order is either imbedded within or emerges inside
complex systems.
4. Complex systems may provide new insights into our view of determinism and free will. (41)
The first three claims seem to belong strictly to chaos theory. The fourth concern brings a more humanistic aspect to Mackey’s study, which can also be
seen in the second half of his title, ‘‘James Joyce’s Everyman.’’ Mackey hopes
to find, in the basic unpredictability of complex systems, some assurance that
even in a deterministic universe we have a kind of freedom. Since the sensitive
interrelations mentioned in point two ‘‘make it impossible’’ for us to overcome
our ignorance of the future, even small actions on our part may result in unexpected changes in the course of destiny (49). The argument that this means
we have ‘‘free will’’ remains somewhat vague; the fact that our minor acts may
have great consequences does not prove that we were free in choosing those
acts. I think, however, that Mackey is getting at something like the pragmatist
idea that from our perspective (in the midst of chaos) we seem to have free
will and thus for all practical purposes we should act as if we have it. At any
rate, a good deal of Mackey’s speculation about Leopold Bloom relates to the
question of his free will and particularly to the problem of why he fails to prevent Molly from having her adulterous affair with Blazes Boylan.
Peter Francis Mackey has written a remarkably intelligent work, full of a
deep understanding of Ulysses and reflecting a passion for both scientific and
humanistic inquiry. It adds a needed dimension to our understanding of Ulysses and to the general goal of interdisciplinary dialogue. Mackey’s approach is
perhaps most effective in helping to understand the structure of ‘‘Ithaca,’’ the
rather bizarre penultimate chapter of Ulysses that Joyce wrote in the form of a
catechism. Many of the questions (‘‘How did Bloom prepare a collation for a
gentile?’’ [17.354] or ‘‘For what creature was the door of egress a door of ingress?’’ [17.1034]), and their hilarious, increasingly detailed answers, do little
to help, retrospectively, to explain some of its mysteries. All the questions,
however, contribute in one way or another to our seeing Bloom and Stephen
Dedalus as actors in a set of interlocking complex systems: social, religious,
sanitary, biological, physical ( Joyce describes in detail the physics of boiling
water). For Mackey, these interlocking systems demonstrate the claim of anthropologist Gregory Bateson that ‘‘circular chains of causation are the rule
rather than the exception’’ (89). As Mackey argues, the chapter’s ‘‘determined
catechetical method proves as inconclusive about the origin of all causes as
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any method of inquiry does’’ (80). Faced with the complex system that is Ulysses, we are tempted to ask, ‘‘How can we isolate a first cause in a sea of contingency?’’ (90). The answer of course, is that ‘‘we cannot.’’ In Ulysses, although
we can learn a great deal about particular complex systems, Mackey shows
that ‘‘questions about the first answer, the cause, the source of meaning, remain unanswered’’ (90).



Pericles Lewis
Yale University

Fashioning Sapphism: The Origins of a Modern English Lesbian Culture by Laura
Doan. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001. Pp. xxii Ⳮ 284. $16.50
paper.
With this book Laura Doan makes a significant contribution to the study
of lesbian identity formation in the early twentieth century. Future studies in
the field will need to take account of her interventions. Doan—co-editor of
the Columbia volume Palatable Poison: Critical Perspectives on ‘‘The Well of
Loneliness’’—begins by re-examining the scandal surrounding the 1928 publication and suppression of Radclyffe Hall’s novel, typically acknowledged as a
foundational moment in the establishment of a self-identified lesbian culture
in Britain. Alan Sinfield has recently argued that Wilde’s trials in 1895 were
significant in establishing new possibilities in sexual identity construction,
rather than in exposing an already extant subculture. Applying this premise of
a newly constructed identity merging with a public event, as opposed to a
newly opened closet, Doan concludes that the suppression of Hall’s novel was
based less on fear of lesbianism per se than on a more generalized misogynistic
paranoia resulting from the extension of the suffrage during the same year. Indeed, Doan marshals persuasive evidence that the novel’s critical reception in
the British press was generally sympathetic, even among such conservative
critics as Arnold Bennett. She attributes the absence of a broad, clearly-defined
anti-lesbian discourse in this period to the lack of any publicly identifiable lesbian subculture. Hall’s novel—and, to perhaps an even greater degree, Hall’s
public persona, and her widely-perceived identification with the novel’s lesbian protagonist—established a generally legible lesbian identity for the first
time in Britain. (Doan is careful not to conflate public identities with private
arrangements, however, specifically refuting the assumption that ‘‘romantic
friendships’’ among ‘‘New Women’’ in the preceding period were typically
asexual.)
Sharply focused in terms of period and locality, this study is sensitive to
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contrasts with the differing modalities of lesbian identity formation in other
contexts—specifically, the more widely studied lesbian subculture in Modernist Paris. In an attempt to avoid the anachronistic implications of the nowcurrent term ‘‘lesbian,’’ Doan defines as ‘‘Sapphic modernity’’ the confluence
of the private with the public in various discourses of English modernity,
which she systematically sets out in a series of chapters structured around the
careers of prominent women in a variety of professions. Having bracketed the
term, the author reverts to the word ‘‘lesbian’’ in describing these Sapphic
moderns throughout the text. While the Parisian lesbian subculture was
closely implicated in the cultural avant-garde, Sapphic modernity in England
was more commonly characterized by social and aesthetic conservatism. Nor
were the British feminist traditions of the New Woman necessarily adopted by
British lesbians in this period.
The 1920s saw two unsuccessful attempts to extend England’s legal prohibition of sexual relations between males to include sexual relations between
females. The archeology of this failed legislation exposes the connections between legal and sexological discourses in the tentative emergence of a public
definition of the lesbian. It is precisely within the area of law enforcement that
Doan goes on to discover her most vivid example of initiatory lesbian selfinvention and self-presentation. Starting in 1918, two rival, private women’s
police forces attempted simultaneously to gain recognition as official branches
of the London Metropolitan Police. The women who organized these groups
were not specifically defined as lesbian, although historians have subsequently
categorized several of them as such. They were, however, subjected to intense
scrutiny in terms of perceived transgressions of gender-appropriate behaviors
and modes of self-presentation. As upper- and upper-middle class women situating a range of female masculinities within the cultural establishment, these
figures brought issues of sexual nonconformity under public scrutiny when
their cause was debated in a 1920–21 legal dispute. Specifically, advocates of
the better-connected force charged their opposite party with a double impersonation—as illegitimate representations of the London Metropolitan Police,
and as women whose gender was blurred by excessively masculine uniforms,
with implications of sexual ‘‘perversity.’’ In fact, differences between the uniforms of the two groups were minimal; their identifying sartorial effects were,
ultimately, located in their spectatorial reception, which changed with the political and professional alliances these groups were able to form with the male
establishment.
In terms of high fashion, Doan makes it clear that the association of androgynous costume with lesbian identity was an instance of reclamation from
the larger culture, rather than mainstreaming of an established subcultural
code. It did not constitute a public declaration of lesbian identity for an upperclass or upper-middle-class Englishwoman in the 1920s to appear in ‘‘masculine’’ attire; yet ‘‘within a discrete, perhaps minuscule, subculture, lesbians
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passed as stylishly recognizable lesbians as well as women of fashion’’ (120).
This period of sartorial androgyny provided women who were consciously experimenting with definitions of gender and sexuality, such as the artist Gluck
and the writer Bryher, with freedom in modes of self-presentation which
would only later appear as dangerously transgressive in Britain. Only in cases
of actual male impersonation—such as that of Valerie Arkell-Smith, convicted
of impersonating a military officer—did androgynous female fashion lead to
scandal or legal prohibition and the reinforcement of gender binaries.
Doan asserts that at least some women in this period consciously used the
work of sexologists in their own attempts at self-identification, and not simply
in the pathologizing sense that critics have customarily ascribed to this discourse. In the 1920s, sexology did not constitute a stabilized system. Controversies among sexologists, as well as changing positions within the work of a
given writer such as Havelock Ellis, reveal a discourse in flux. Radclyffe Hall
found inspiration in Ellis’s writings, and sought his imprimatur for The Well.
Doan’s close reading of the novel reveals how it deploys a creative inconsistency as Hall works sexological theory into her plot. Krafft-Ebing’s pathologizing system of sexual classification is the explicit pretext for the novel, but it is
invoked only to be discounted. The most significant influence on Hall’s definition of lesbianism, in this reading, is the work of Ellis and of Edward Carpenter. In a once influential alternative to Freud, both Ellis and Carpenter saw
love as a metaphysically redemptive rather than neurotic component of sexuality. Hall writes from this premise, but contradicts Ellis’s etiology of homosexuality. While Ellis took the congenitalist position, Hall’s plot proposes a
‘‘nurture over nature’’ theory. Ellis further rejected the Krafft-Ebing system of
sexual ‘‘types,’’ while Hall proposed the lesbian as a distinct form of being, divisible into various categories. In this, she was strongly directed by Carpenter’s
theory of the intermediate type, adopting his masculine bias to purposes of
female self-fashioning. Hall further adopts Carpenter’s elitist claims for the intermediate type’s supposedly superior talents, intellect, and spiritual enlightenment. Doan finds evolutionary theory converging with sexology in the
conclusion of Hall’s novel, when male and female intermediate types marry—a
union which promises to produce children possessing the superior qualities of
the intermediate.
Contemporaries of Hall’s, such as Bryher and Rose Allatini, used the theory of the English sexologists to similar purpose in their novels, which Doan
also explicates. How widespread was this influence? Which readers, at which
times, were aware of sexology texts, either by reading the texts themselves or
by discussing them with those who had? Doan finds evidence that upper- and
upper-middle-class women had limited access to these texts, but could and
often did obtain access with a modicum of effort. Secondary or tertiary knowledge of sexological theory was sufficiently established in 1920s London for it
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to be represented in popular culture. Elsa Lanchester, for example, made sexological categories the subject of a cabaret act. Doan proposes a ‘‘taxonomy of
readers’’ in discussing who found what in a given text: ‘‘those in the know,
those unknowing, and those who knew-but-didn’t-know’’ (181). This multiple signification is particularly clear in Doan’s analysis of visual texts.
While portrait photographs from this period showing women in ‘‘male’’
costume often appear to contemporary eyes as unambiguous declarations of
lesbian sexual identity, in most cases these photographs carried no overt sexual implications for their sitters. Doan reproduces persuasive evidence of this
contextualizing interpretation, including a 1929 engagement portrait showing
a heterosexual couple displaying matching suits, hairstyles, and profiles. The
portrait photograph was then as now a tool of self-imaging. The signifiers deployed in these portraits from the 1920s have evolved new meanings, and
must be viewed historically. Specifically, the ‘‘boyish’’ modes of the period are
now difficult to distinguish from the ‘‘butch’’ modes of mid-century lesbian
identification. Doan does not claim that the mannish lesbian was a mid-century invention; her focus is on the evolution of the signifier, rather than that
of the signified. This argument credits the sitters, not the photographers, as the
controlling influence in representation. The London policewomen presented
themselves in publicity photos as briskly maternal guardians of lost children,
but made a fatal public-relations miscalculation in a series of staged photos
depicting their rescue of an adult male drunkard. These last images played
into the hands of critics who charged the policewomen with behavior inappropriate to their gender. Hall and the artist Gluck used chic, androgynous selfimaging to establish themselves as avant-garde figures. These photographs
were widely circulated in the press, and did not carry the risk of coming-out
statements, safely participating as they did in current fashion trends. Sitters
lost control of the image as it circulated and was appropriated by the viewer.
It was only when taken out of its originary frame that Hall’s image was appropriated as the archetypal mannish lesbian icon.
As an incitement to further research, this book is exemplary. Doan clearly
possesses a strong working knowledge of a broad range of cultural fields, and
brings this breadth to bear upon a sharply focused project. Certainly more
work remains to be done on this subject. This book gives only perfunctory
treatment to the Bloomsbury circle, and less than perfunctory treatment to the
fecund areas of British cinema, music, and theatre in this period. It is a measure of Doan’s success that her reader’s only complaints are in the nature of
desiring more.



Craig Smith
Wayne State University
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William Blake: The Creation of the Songs: From Manuscript to Illuminated Printing
by Michael Phillips. London: The British Library and Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 2000. Pp. xi Ⳮ 180. 72 color plates, 37 black-andwhite illustrations. $55.00 cloth, $29.95 paper.
To prepare himself to write this study of the genesis of Blake’s Songs of
Innocence and of Experience, Michael Phillips gave two years of evenings to
learning how to print, travelled all over the world to examine all but two of
the fifty known copies, and studied in minute detail the notebook in which
Blake entered drafts of all the poems of Experience, trying to establish, by tracing changes in ink colors and nib sizes, the sequence of occasions in which
Blake entered or revised them. He also studied the political atmosphere of England and local events in Lambeth at the time Blake worked on the Songs, reading at length through parish records and newspaper advertisements. The
results of all this research are gathered here in a handsome volume published
to coincide with the major Blake exhibition at the Tate Gallery (November
2000), of which Phillips was a guest curator.
The seventy-two color plates are beautifully done and worth the price of
the book alone (happily published in paperback from the outset). Anyone interested in comparing the often widely different colorings of certain plates
should place this book beside the recent Blake Trust/Princeton edition of the
Songs, edited by Andrew Lincoln (1991), and the older Trianon/Orion/Oxford
version, edited by Geoffrey Keynes (1967); there is just one duplication of a
plate. For not very much money we now can own good reproductions of at
least one plate from twenty-one copies of Innocence or of the joint Songs. They
are all different from one another, too, sometimes in striking ways, sometimes
in subtle. Phillips gives us six versions of the title-page of Innocence, for instance, and five each of the Innocence ‘‘Holy Thursday’’ and the Experience
‘‘Nurse’s Song,’’ as well as a ‘‘London’’ and a ‘‘Tyger.’’ (The ‘‘Tyger’’ is the same
as the one from Copy T in the Blake Trust/Princeton edition; it is, alas, no
more ferocious than in other copies, but is surrealistically colored like a calico
barber pole.) With the expanding on-line Blake Archive and improving desktop printers we may soon have even better means to ponder the effects of varying colorings, effects perhaps even on the meanings of the accompanying
texts, but for now we must be grateful for these additions to what is in print.
Among the plates are reproductions of eighteen pages of the notebook
(N 98–115 in the Erdman numbering)—those pages that carry texts or designs
relevant to the Songs. These too are splendid: we can see what Phillips means
by the different shades of ink and widths of nib. There are no transcripts in
ordinary type as there are in David Erdman’s edition of the notebook (Oxford,
1973); instead, in a very long central chapter, Phillips takes us step by step
through the entire eighteen pages, transcribing each version of each poem and
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noting each revision or crossing-out. Among the plates, finally, are photographs of Phillips’s own copper plate copy of the Innocence title-page, and a
few plates by other printers of Blake’s day.
Though it stays focused on the evolution of the Songs, the book still seems
something of a hybrid. Relatively short chapters on the printing techniques
frame the long chapter on the notebook; the explanations of the former presume little knowledge and are generally very clear, but some technical details
are controversial and can be assessed only by other specialists (of which this
reviewer is not one). Sometimes ballooning out from amidst the usually chaste
and exacting accounts of the notebook variora are detailed reports of Phillips’s
discoveries of possible sources or inspirations of the poems, complete with illustrations, but however interesting these may be (I will take up a few of
them), they throw the book off balance because they do not take their place
beside the comparable research of many scholars before him. One who
chooses this book as an introduction to the Songs will get a peculiar impression
of Blake’s historical milieu. Space was doubtless limited, but some of Phillips’s
research belongs in articles addressed to other scholars and not, or not at such
length, in a commentary that looks to be thorough.
He offers a long argument, for example, against taking November 1792 as
the terminus ad quem of notebook entries that led to the Songs, a date widely
accepted on the basis of Blake’s allusions to Lafayette’s arrest by the Austrians,
news of which arrived in London that month. Phillips has found documents
from a few months later that he believes shed light on the drafts, and to use
them he must postdate the completion of the notebook. His first claim relies
on Nancy Bogan’s offering of a source for the intriguing stanzas that seem intended for what became ‘‘London’’:
Why should I care for the men of Thames
Or the cheating waves of charterd streams
Or shrink at the little blasts of fear
That the hireling blows into my ear
Tho born on the cheating banks of Thames
Tho his waters bathed my infant limbs
The Ohio shall wash his stains from me
I was born a slave but I long to be free
Bogen suggested that Blake thought of the Ohio River because he had been
reading Gilbert Imlay’s A Topographical Description of the Western Territory of
North America, published in 1792. What Phillips has discovered is that the
book did not appear until the end of the year; he has located its first advertisement in The Public Advertiser for 12 December, in a column next to one that
was likely to capture Blake’s attention: a warning ‘‘to certain Print-shops
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wherein libellous Pictures and Engravings are daily exhibited’’ that their owners may be prosecuted. This is a nice piece of research, and it is certainly possible that Blake was pushed and pulled toward the thought of the Ohio by these
two articles. Yet the Ohio was so well known and so frequently cited in poetry
that Blake hardly needed to see it again in print. Major battles with the French
had taken place along its banks, battles celebrated in many a verse. If he
wanted a contrast to the Thames, the Ohio was almost inevitable. Joel Barlow’s
Vision of Columbus (1787), which we know Blake read, mentions it five times.
Dyer mentions it in The Fleece (1757). A trawl through the English Poetry
Data-Base will produce many more instances.
Phillips extends the date later still by citing a poem by John Thelwall of
April 1793 where ‘‘charter’d’’ is used rather as Blake used it (though not of a
river); here the same point can be made: the term had been widely deployed
for several years, as Phillips acknowledges. He wants to extend the date well
into 1793 because by then the anti-French reaction had taken hold and Blake’s
fear of it may have registered in his work, but it is difficult to see what is really
gained by a later date, for none of the evidence he has found, it seems to me;
counts as an unequivocal source for any of the drafts, let alone an allusion that
might alter the way we read them. He cites, and reproduces, a ledger of the
accounts of the Parish of Lambeth, where Blake was then living, where it is
indicated that an unknown child was found dead in February 1793; the news
would have been ‘‘the catalyst for the bitter irony of Blake’s railing satire’’ of
‘‘Holy Thursday’’ in Experience. This may well be so—though it is the design,
not the text, that presents a dead child—but was it not common in London
for children to die of malnutrition?
In general Phillips sees Blake as highly suggestible along a narrow register
of subjects, largely social and political. Building on the argument of Nurmi,
Erdman, and Paulson that Blake’s tyger owes its birth less to a cosmic blacksmith than to the September Massacres, which several British observers likened to tigerish behavior, Phillips concludes, ‘‘ ‘The Tyger’ may be a metaphor
for the forces of revolution in France.’’ Yet the fact that tigers were sometimes
enlisted as metaphors for events in France does not make every tiger French.
The tiger has been an emblem of cruelty since the Aeneid. The poem is highly
resistant to any single line of interpretation and seems to shrug off political
allusions with ease; they would only diminish it in any case. When Phillips
then goes on to say that Blake might have taken the local reaction against the
revolution as itself tigerlike, he is building on air.
Despite the way they intrude into the commentary, and despite my disagreements with some of them, I am glad to have these digressions into Blake’s
situation. A haunting photograph of Fore Street, Lambeth Riverside, may or
may not be from the neighborhood Blake had in mind as the setting for ‘‘London’’—after all, its speaker wanders through ‘‘each charter’d street,’’ not just
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those nearby—but it conveys something of the London we too easily forget
and Blake knew all too well. Phillips is at work on a biography of Blake in
Lambeth during the anti-Jacobin reaction, on which he has published interesting articles. I hope he will enrich it with as many pictures as he can find, not
so much to nail down a source or allusion as to present the world (or one of
the worlds) Blake dwelled in, a world almost entirely lost.
I also found many of the details about Blake’s notebook sessions interesting, though it is not clear what implications, if any, they have for how we interpret the final works. Phillips points out that the ‘‘Introduction’’ to Experience
is not found in the notebook. ‘‘Earth’s Answer’’ is, but it is tied at the outset to
‘‘Thou hast a lap full of seed,’’ with which it shares some imagery. That poem
was abandoned. In its new context, following an ‘‘Introduction’’ almost certainly composed after it, ‘‘Earth’s Answer’’ is ‘‘profoundly altered.’’ Indeed one
is tempted to say that its history explains why ‘‘Earth’s Answer’’ seems not
quite an answer to the voice of the bard, or seems an answer to someone else.
Still, even if he did not have the bard in mind when he wrote the ‘‘Answer,’’
Blake must have had the ‘‘Answer’’ in mind when he wrote the ‘‘Introduction,’’
and in any case he engraved them both and placed them in succession in all
copies. So we must take them together as a single work, or a pair of works in
dialogue, however they came to be. It then becomes part of its meaning, its
literary effect, that Earth seems half deaf.
One more detail worth relishing: Blake seems to have worked on ‘‘London’’ and ‘‘The Tyger’’ on the same occasion. Two of the greatest poems in English on the same day!
I shall be brief about the chapters on Blake’s printing methods. Much of
it is uncontroversial and clearly explained, along with good reproductions of
contemporary printing equipment. Phillips disagrees with Essick and Viscomi,
on whose work he builds, on such details as the speed with which Blake could
print his pages, whether he printed the Songs plates in pairs or separately, and
whether he normally printed his plates once or twice—that is, passed them
through the press only once or, as Phillips believes, passed them through a
second time with different colored inks. I will leave it to those better qualified
than I am to assess his claims. These disputes notwithstanding, I find it remarkable how much we do know about this obscure London engraver: where
he got his copper plate and the sizes he cut it down to, when and where he
got his paper and how he treated it before printing on it, what pigments he
used for hand watercoloring, what acids for the bath, and so on. His characteristic method, relief etching, is pretty well understood now; Phillips contrasts
it clearly with intaglio, and offers the suggestive analogy—intaglio is to relief
etching as Locke’s blank slate is to innate ideas—which ties his method to his
core beliefs about the soul and nature.
On one seemingly technical point—whether, apart from the Songs, Blake
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composed directly on the copper plate (in a wax ‘‘resist’’), as many scholars
believe, or he wrote and revised on paper before transcribing onto copper, as
Phillips believes—I have to say I think Phillips has the better argument,
though he might have been more explicit about what ‘‘composing’’ means. It
is true that we lack first drafts of almost all later works and some earlier ones,
but the argument from silence is dangerous; surely it is more remarkable that
the Songs notebook has survived than that other textbooks have not. Moreover
there is the manuscript of The Four Zoas, a draft of a work never engraved but
quarried for Milton and Jerusalem. It is also true that Blake claimed that Jerusalem was dictated to him, but if Blake was taking it down onto copper plate the
dictator must have been the most patient of spirits. In any case, Blake gives it
away in Jerusalem itself, where he writes, ‘‘When this Verse was first dictated
to me I consider’d a Monotonous Cadence like that used by Milton &
Shakspeare. . . .’’ We get the absurd idea of ‘‘Verse’’ whose ‘‘Cadence’’ is not
determined! Blake appears to have ‘‘consider’d’’ a great deal, and it is hard to
agree that he did it all while hovering over the plate. He had to lay out the
design, with space for the text, and then write the text, backward, in careful
‘‘copperplate hand,’’ in a sticky resist. He could erase mistakes, but it cost
some time and trouble even before the resist hardened. It is pleasing to imagine his spiritual advisers coming every day with different inks and nibs, making him cross out what they dictated the day before, and sitting around
chatting while he labored over his plates. But that was their job; they were his
own spirits.



Michael Ferber
University of New Hampshire

Quoting Shakespeare: Form and Culture in Early Modern Drama by Douglas
Bruster. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000. Pp. 288. $50.00 cloth.
There is a stark contrast between the specific readings of early modern
texts Douglas Bruster offers in Quoting Shakespeare: Form and Culture in Early
Modern Drama, and his attempt to situate these readings theoretically around
the concept of ‘‘quotation.’’ All the readings are rich and engaged; the readings
of Marlowe’s ‘‘The Passionate Shepherd’’ (Chapter Two, a version of an article
that appeared in Criticism) and Shakespeare and Fletcher’s The Two Noble Kinsmen (Chapter Five, a version of an article that appeared in Shakespeare Quarterly) are, I think, brilliant. Bruster’s efforts, however, to define his ‘‘mode of
reading’’ (13) and differentiate it from various formulations of New Historicism—by using the terms ‘‘quotation’’ and ‘‘bricolage’’ instead of ‘‘appropriation’’ or ‘‘circulation’’ to explain how words and things get into a literary
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text—are labored. In that, this book stands as fairly representative of the times:
New Historical tenets (with numerous modifications) still allow for great work
to be done, but talking about New Historical tenets bores people to tears and,
with no theoretical breakthrough on the horizon, any discussion of theory in
early modern studies remains a tedious task.
Bruster actually says something similar early on: various critical ‘‘approaches are being reshuffled rather than rethought, leaving the field busy but
without the direction it once had’’ (13). He says, too, with admirable and refreshing frankness, ‘‘this book offers no magic solution’’ (13). And then he eschews novelty: ‘‘It is certainly not my claim . . . that no one has ever read books
in this way before. . . . (14). Nonetheless, the pressure to reshuffle—if not create theoretical magic and read in a way no one has read before—remains
strong in academic publishing and Bruster complies, it seems, grudgingly:
‘‘We might provisionally define quotation as the incorporation, in a text, of
discrete elements from outside that text, with or without acknowledgment’’
(16). These ‘‘elements’’ can be, in addition to other texts, actions, relationships, etc. Rather than talk about quotation in the modern sense—‘‘the reduplication, typically with acknowledgment, of others’ words . . . for which we
have both cultural protocols and an array of punctuation’’ (16)—Bruster suggests that a broader (more early modern) use of ‘‘quotation’’ can function as
something of a critical tool: ‘‘We can learn more about texts and the history
they incorporate if we look beyond the provocative material that New Historicism commonly employs, for the positions of texts and authors—their orientation, habits, and inclinations—often appear most clearly in otherwise ordinary
borrowings’’ (5). I have no argument with this claim. But Bruster spends too
much time ‘‘positioning’’ his ‘‘quotations’’ in and around New Historical ‘‘appropriations.’’ It seems preferable to make the general and simple point that
New Historicists need to focus more on immediate literary or linguistic ‘‘appropriations’’ or ‘‘borrowings’’ or ‘‘quotations’’ or whatever.
And I do not use ‘‘whatever’’ loosely here. Right now, recently freed from
restrictive metaphors of representation (‘‘reflection,’’ etc.), it does not seem
particularly meaningful which metaphors we use—‘‘borrows,’’ ‘‘appropriates,’’
‘‘registers,’’ ‘‘participates in,’’ ‘‘exchanges with,’’ circulates in,’’ or ‘‘quotes’’—to
explain our greater openness to the complexity of the relationship between life
and the production of art. Indeed, almost as soon as Bruster gives us ‘‘quotation’’ he feels compelled to introduce yet another apt but, at the moment, fairly
useless term: ‘‘bricolage.’’ ‘‘Such terms characterize making as fabrication
rather than as creation and ask us to see that dramatic texts were bricolage—a
pastiche of various to-hand materials, sometimes by a handyman or bricoleur’’
(22). One might get the sense that Bruster wishes he did not have to play with
nomenclature and could simply use ‘‘quotation’’ as an explicit organizational
device for his chapters, correcting bad tendencies in New Historicism as he
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goes along. ‘‘I am skeptical about the usefulness of larger paradigms and categories for certain acts of interpretation, whether phrased as ‘influence’ or ‘the
Elizabethan world picture’ or ‘social energy’ . . .’’ (211–12).
Once Bruster finishes discussing his ‘‘mode of reading,’’ and if one ignores
the related connections between chapters, the book stands as a wonderful collection of essays. Chapter Two demonstrates the significance of Marlowe’s
‘‘The Passionate Shepherd’’ by studying together the works ‘‘that it quoted’’
and ‘‘works that quoted it’’ (56). This apparently tranquil lyric elicited such
strong and often violent responses in part because Marlowe ‘‘quoted’’ (‘‘appropriated’’?) from a long ‘‘tradition of amatory invitations’’ (57) that were very
much about asserting the lyrical speaker’s power. ‘‘Tracing a pattern of quotations’’ from Theocritus, to Vergil, to Ovid, to Marlowe, to Raleigh and Donne
and forward, reveals a threat ‘‘lurking behind . . . the sensuous invitation’’
(84). Other writers quoting from and responding to the poem make the threat
visible. The drama, in particular, in its reliance on dialogue and insistence on
the social, puts ‘‘into motion’’ the seemingly ‘‘monological rigor’’ of the lyric
and exposes its often ‘‘brutal urges’’ for control when it quotes the poem (86).
In a particularly remarkable piece of this extended analysis, Bruster catches
glimpses of this process in The Merry Wives of Windsor when the parson Hugh
Evans quotes Marlowe to empower or console himself (64–5). Here the focus
on ‘‘quotations’’ tells us much about ‘‘The Passionate Shepherd’’—and several
other works. Nevertheless, Bruster only corrects tendencies in New Historicism—its (1) interest in the synchronic (‘‘sideways’’ reading) at the expense of
the diachronic and (2) its strange lack of interest in literary borrowings.
Chapter Three turns us back, again, to the neglected literary borrowings—in this case, Shakespeare from Plautus—and asks us to consider patterns of quotations (or borrowings). Not as innovative or illuminating as the
work on Marlowe, this chapter argues convincingly nonetheless. It looks at
aristocratic controlling figures in Shakespeare—Portia, Prospero, Theseus and
Oberon—and notes ‘‘Shakespeare’s tendency to displace the agency of the resourceful slave [in Plautus] upward on the social scale’’ (90). When Shakespeare adapts the ‘‘servus’’ as ‘‘poeta’’ figure in Plautus, the wit and intelligence
that make this figure so powerful gets transferred to someone of higher social
standing. Puck, for example, is necessary to Oberon not for ‘‘wit and intelligence’’ but for ‘‘geographical and social mobility’’ (108). Such a pattern allows
us to say a great deal about Shakespeare’s politics.
In contrast to Chapter Three, Chapter Four is provocative, but not entirely convincing. Challenging the current orthodoxy that says The Tempest
deals with colonialist discourse and new worlds, Bruster argues that Shakespeare ‘‘quoted’’ (or whatever) ‘‘relationships’’ between himself and the world
of the theater as his ‘‘most salient sources’’ (118). In Prospero and Miranda we
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see Shakespeare as playwright/director guiding an audience member’s responses; in Prospero and Ariel we see Shakespeare as playwright/director
training and working with a compliant, but indentured, boy actor; in Prospero
and Caliban we see Shakespeare as playwright/director working with a not so
compliant—indeed, not so ‘‘human’’—Will Kemp. (So much for Shakespeare’s
thoughts on the famous clown.) Bruster is sharp when starting with the ‘‘theater as ship’’ trope that opens the play and, true to some of his comments in
the Introduction, he uses ‘‘ordinary’’ language borrowings from the theater to
make some intriguing connections. For example, the ‘‘high-day!’’ that closes
Caliban’s song in Act Two refers to Kemp’s use of similar phrases (137). The
argument, however, rests on these small analogies.
Chapter Five, on The Two Noble Kinsmen, makes a provocative and convincing case for the significance of the Jailer’s Daughter in early modern dramatic study. The mad language of this ‘‘otherwise’’ disempowered’’ character
standing ‘‘outside the play’s self-definition of the social’’ (145) registers ‘‘the
increasing separation of court and city from the country’’ (170). This culturewide separation of social spheres includes the dramatic shift from Shakespeare’s ‘‘more popular forms of drama’’ (135) to Fletcher’s ‘‘more aristocratic’’
theater (155) and the collaboration of the two playwrights at a moment when
the former was giving way to the latter produces this unique character. The
Jailer’s Daughter functions, then, as something of a transitional marker in history. Through a fascinating analysis of her language, Bruster shows that many
of her words ‘‘float’’ within the play, unable to ‘‘find an object’’ (156) because
her ‘‘thoughts’’ are, in fact, bits of the fast disappearing world of folk culture
not thoroughly integrated into the play. As Bruster ingeniously points out,
however, the mix of the new theater (and its interest in strong, individualized
female roles) with the old, inflects these bits of folk culture with a ‘‘complex
individual psychology’’ (161): ‘‘what is inside her mind turns out to be the
outside world’’ (158). Not random at all, the Jailer’s Daughter’s quotations
provide something of a Jamesonian political unconscious for the play: ‘‘demarcated from the rest of the drama . . . hidden yet present, unseen at the same
time powerful’’ (162).
Having suggested to his readers in the first paragraph that this book considers ‘‘Shakespeare both quoting and quoted’’ (3), Bruster finds himself having to begin his final chapter by explaining that one might have expected ‘‘a
full length study of Shakespearean quotations’’ (171). He then promises to
‘‘address’’ the expectation. Not surprisingly, the last chapter can not fully address the potentially misleading title, but, again, the chapter itself is engaging.
Bruster follows a line of inquiry opened by Hugh Grady and Richard Halpern
in looking at the American Modernists’ use of the ‘‘English Renaissance,’’ suggesting that early twentieth-century Americans ‘‘quoted’’—and thus helped
make—the English Renaissance because they saw it in ‘‘usable’’ material’’ to
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define ‘‘distinction, prestige, and ‘class’ ’’ in their world (208). This last chapter
is filled with much bricolage and interesting speculation not previously published.



Ken Jackson
Wayne State University

The Reluctant Film Art of Woody Allen by Peter J. Bailey. Lexington: University
Press of Kentucky, 2001. Pp. 344. $29.95 cloth.
Few could have imagined, when Woody Allen began his career telling
jokes about his pet ant or the moose he took to a costume party, that he would
eventually turn into one of America’s, if not the world’s, most prolific artists.
With three plays, numerous short stories and essays, as well as over thirty
films, one nearly every year since Take the Money and Run (1969), he has produced a consistent body of work. For me the high water mark is Crimes and
Misdeamnors (1989), a film that combines rich comic characters with some of
the deepest and most trenchant comments on the plight of modern existential
man; for others, I know that his Oscar-winning Annie Hall (1977) and Manhattan (1979) stand as his finest work. We might also throw in Hannah and Her
Sisters (1986) and some of the early comedies. Few directors have had such a
run of luck.
Nonetheless, in recent years, Allen’s career has not fared well. Revelations
of a private nature have cast a shadow over the rather benign persona that he
had maintained. Possibly the scandal over his marriage to a much younger
woman and more recently a law suit against his former producers have eroded
his fan base. While Hannah earned $40 million at the box office, Sweet and
Lowdown (2000), despite the nomination of its female star, only earned a paltry
$4 million. More importantly, his work has also lost the urgency and potency
that used to make it a subject of discussion in most intellectual circles. His
latest, Curse of the Jade Scorpion, which carries on the trend of his most recent
work of seeming little more than a tired reworking of old material, is a case in
point.
None of this detracts, however, from his importance as a filmmaker. Ironically, he owes little of his success to American cinema. Despite Hollywood’s
fondness for him—he and his female co-stars are frequent nominees and
Oscar winners—he seems to have eschewed anything that can be found in
most of the films produced there, except for the iconoclasts like the Marx
Brothers and Preston Sturges. Instead, one of his trademarks lies is his devotion to those European directors who have matched medium and message, especially Fellini, Antonioni, and Bergman. There is a wonderful parody of
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Antonioni in Everything You Want to Know about Sex and in Manhattan the
image of the skeleton in the classroom center frame, after everyone has left,
equals the best of Bergman. Nonetheless, I agree with Peter J. Bailey in The
Reluctant Film Art of Woody Allen that ‘‘to dismiss his movies on the grounds
that they are derivative . . . of classic European or Hollywood films is to ignore
how deliberately his work addresses and complicates precisely those questions
of artistic derivation and imitation and also investigates their relationship to
the artist’s mental stability’’ (235).
Obviously, the ‘‘real’’ Woody Allen and his screen persona are worlds
apart. Most of the time his screen persona falls into the schlemiel category, a
failure at love and work—Allen is neither. Furthermore, one doesn’t need to
be a Freudian (Allen’s former favorite form of therapy) to know that a true
schlemiel and/or neurotic could not produce the sheer volume of work that
Allen has. More often than not those personalities are paralyzed with fear, producing little or no work, or drown themselves in booze or other addictions.
Whatever may be said about Allen’s private life, he seems to have escaped both
those fates.
A different kind of neurosis, however, might be the impetus to his artistic
impulse. Bailey sees Allen as having an ‘‘intransigently, skeptical, highly conflictual attitude towards his own art’’ (4). He argues that Allen has an ambivalent attitude to the nature of art, one that questions whether art serves any
valuable purpose. Allen emerges in these pages as a ‘‘devotedly Modernist
filmmaker, whose movies gravitate incessantly—if reluctantly—toward the interrogation of their own conditions of postmodernist skepticism, disillusionment, and narcissistic self-reflexivity’’ (5).
While making for an elaborate and sometimes overwrought examination
of some of Allen’s oeuvre, Bailey’s approach does contain more than a modicum of truth. For the most part, Bailey astutely discusses those movies, mostly
from 1977 on, that deal in some way with the value of art. They range from
serious fare like Stardust Memories (1980), and Crimes, to lighter fare like Purple Rose of Cairo and Broadway Danny Rose. All deal with artists of some kind,
not always successful ones, or with Art itself, usually filmmaking. The most
complex of Allen’s movies lend themselves best to this argument. Manhattan,
an uncannily prescient movie, contrasts ‘‘artistic perfection’’ with ‘‘human perfidy and deceit’’ (49), a theme taken up with equal power in Crimes. Bailey
also offers interesting insights into some movies that might be dismissed. Radio
Days, on the surface little more than light piffle, becomes a debate between
the ‘‘virtues of entertainment’’ and the ‘‘culturally superior claims of serious
art.’’
Bailey’s readings show an Allen constantly questioning and never satisfied. Ultimately, however, it paints a rather bleak view of Allen’s attitude. Allen
certainly has a dark side. He once remarked that ‘‘every morning I contemplate
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suicide’’ and some of his writings show a cynical contempt for human nature,
none more ringing than his statement that ‘‘inside very heart live[s] the worm
of self-preservation, of fear, greed and an animal will to power.’’ At the same
time, Allen has often pulled back from the brink. In many of his movies one
fines a sheer, unalloyed joy that counters the darkness that might lurk beneath.
Bailey all too often ignores these more benign readings. When in Hannah, after
a showing failed suicide attempt, Allen, achieves a rather obvious reconciliation with art by going to see a Marx Brothers movie, Bailey poohpoohs it. ‘‘He
was happy at the time (117), and he regretted it so much that he made Crimes
three years later as an antidote’’ (128). In this way, movie after movie turns
into a rather dour and dark search for meaning, rather than a laugh riot that
many of them are. Allen becomes Samuel Beckett redux. The ‘‘fictional character . . . ‘Woody Allen’ may live on in the hearts of film viewers everywhere but
Woody Allen won’t live on anywhere, and that discrepancy encapsulates Allen’s primary gripe with art’’ (69). But Allen is not Beckett: ‘‘Woody Allen’’ is
not Didi or Gogo ‘‘bestrid the grave’’ or Winnie endlessly pratting on. The cumulative effect of Bailey’s argument is to rob Allen of what makes his work so
enduring.
While one cannot doubt Bailey’s expertise, the reductive quality of the
reading makes the movies less and not more than they are. While astute on
some movies, like the often neglected Shadows and Fog, the text tries to make
all the movies fit, even when some won’t bear the reading. I question, for example, his reading of Bullets, for one. Bailey argues that Allen shares some of
the point of view towards the role of the artist with the playwright Shayne in
Bullets over Broadway. When Shayne says, ‘‘I’m not an artist. There I’ve said it
and I feel free,’’ he argues that this is Allen’s ‘‘most unequivocally condemnatory concluding judgment on art and artists’’ (169) but Shayne, it is clear from
the movie, never was an artist. He couldn’t write and needed the real artist, the
hit man Cheech, to save his work. If anything, Allen is condemning the faux
artist rather than using him as the mouthpiece for his own views on art. Allen
is not and has never been ‘‘free.’’ And if he wanted to be, he would not now
be working on his 36th movie.
Mashey Bernstein
University of California, Santa Barbara

